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ABSTRACT
The present investigation attempted to extend the psychophysical 
analogy to the study of clinical judgment on the MMPI. Previous judg­
mental research has dealt with multidimensional diagnosis or with simu­
lation of clinicians' judgments on the MMPI. It was believed that the 
previous research examining the process of clinical judgment had not 
employed sufficiently sensitive methodologies. Therefore, in this study 
both direct estimation procedures and classical psychophysical methods 
were employed in an effort to describe and quantify directly the rela­
tionship between clinical judgment and the MMPI. These methods, par­
ticularly the former, have been demonstrated to be beneficial to use 
when exploring the topic of clinical judgment.
Thirty-two Ph.D. clinical psychologists from Minnesota and Kan­
sas served as judges. They made magnitude estimations (with assigned 
modulus) concerning the degree of importance of the ten MMPI basic 
scales and the degree of pathology evidenced by T-scores (30 to 110) 
on each basic scale. Judges also indicated a T-score for each basic 
scale which represented an equal degree of pathology across all scales. 
The method of constant stimuli was employed to determine a score for 
each validity scale which might invalidate the overall profile.
In general, results indicated that judges displayed low agree­
ment on the degree of pathology associated with T-scores below 50 for 
each basic scale. Minnesota judges tended to view lower scores as
xiii
less pathological than did Kansas judges. For T-scores above 50 on each 
scale, perceived pathology was curvilinearly related to the appropriate 
stimulus metric. A log-log transformation rectified the data in a lin­
ear manner, suggesting that power functions could provide an adequate 
description of the data. T-scores above 50 on each scale were arranged 
in three clusters according to perceived pathology. These clusters were 
seen to differ from formally suggested interpretive groupings. Judg­
ments of importance for the basic scales could be typified by three 
clusters which were compared with previous findings. Judges were unable 
to equate T-scores accurately across scales for degree of pathology, and 
implications of this result were discussed. Validity thresholds were 
able to be determined for only three validity scales, and this result 
was discussed in reference to interpretive manuals.
Limitations of the present study were discussed, e.g., the judg­
mental groups were not homogeneous, and the task presented restricted 
the generality of the obtained results.
The implications of the present study include: (1) it repre­
sents an extension of the psychophysical analogy to the present area,
(2) it offers an initial effort to provide a succinct, graphic presen­
tation of clinical judgment on the MMPI which may enhance formal train­
ing, and (3) it provides a variety of future research suggestions; for 




STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
"Too little is known about judgment in both its general and its 
specifically clinical aspects. The subject is researchable, and there 
is no better way to approach an area to be investigated than by mapping 
the areas of ignorance" (Hunt and Jones, 1962, p. 34). The subjective 
decisions of the clinician are aimed at the prediction of significant 
outcomes in the life of another individual, an evaluation wdiich may have 
far-reaching consequences both for the individual and for the society in 
which he lives. This subjective decision has had at its central core a 
reliance upon "clinical intuition" historically. But as the somewhat 
vague and empirically untenable explanation of this clinical wisdom has 
declined throughout the years, it has been replaced by the more innoc­
uous term of clinical judgment. Thus, in view of the potential influ­
ence of clinical judgment in terms of decision making involving human 
beings, it is not surprising that it has begun to be studied intensively 
by investigators all over the world.
Stone (1968c) notes that, there has been a long history of 
exchange between the clinical and psychophysical areas of psychology. 
Further, Watson (1962) commented on the "possibility of showing that 
psychophysics, which occupies one of the highest floors in the Ivory 
Tower [of experimental psychology], is relevant to clinical psychology"
1
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(p. 6). While the term psychophysics has seemed to be synonomous with 
the procedures for solving issues few people cared about, Stevens (1958) 
suggests that psychophysics is a more fruitful area than these concep­
tions imply, as it probes matters of deep human interest "seeking the 
laws that relate the responses of men and animals to the energetic con- 
figural environment" (p. 177). In their attempt to investigate clinical 
judgment, Hunt and Jones (1962) have drawn the suggested analogy between 
the clinical and psychophysical areas. They conclude that " . . .  the 
psychophysical analogy has been a helpful one in our investigation of 
clinical judgment, and . . . will increase our future understanding of 
the judgmental and decision making processes in clinical practice" (p. 
49). However, Hunt and Jones used category scales predominantly in 
their investigations (e.g., seven point category scale concerning 
amount of schizophrenia) which achieve an ordinal level of measure­
ment; whereas, Stone (1968c) mentions that all three major psycho­
physical laws of Fechner, Thurstone and Stevens have "at least the 
mathematical properties of interval scale measurement, and in the 
case of Stevens' power law the obtained psychological scales sup­
posedly are ratio scales" (p. 162). Stone further indicates that 
the direct estimation methods of psychophysics have largely replaced 
the more traditional procedures, as a result of Stevens' power law 
supplanting Fechner's logarithmic law. Thus, it seems as if the 
methods of psychophysics are applicable to the investigation of 
clinical judgment, and perhaps the most valid procedures to employ 
are those involving direct estimation.
Much of the focus on clinical judgment recently has involved 
the use of psychological tests and the validity and reliability of
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clinicians' judgments based on them. One of the more frequently used 
instruments has been the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI). While clinical judgment research with the MMPI has not, to 
date, employed the psychophysical approach, it is believed that a 
similar analogy can be drawn in this area, and that fruitful benefits 
concerning the subjective judgment from the MMPI can accrue.
The present study was conducted, then, in an effort to inves­
tigate subjective judgmental processes involved in the use of the MMPI. 
Both direct estimation procedures and classical psychophysical methods 
were employed in an effort to describe and quantify the relationship 
between clinical judgment and the MMPI.
Development of Scaling Methodology
Psychophysics has been regarded as the science that investigates 
the quantitative relationships between physical events and corresponding 
psychological events. In tracing the development of scaling methodol­
ogy, the initial cornerstone was laid by G. T. Fechner over a hundred 
years ago. Extending E. Weber's work, Fechner developed his logarith­
mic law relating the physical stimulus and subjective reaction. He 
assumed that just noticeable differences (jnd's) were equal along the 
range of sensations measured, i.e., "equally often noticed differences 
are equal" (Stevens, 1957, p. 154). Fechner then reasoned that jnd's 
could be used to measure sensation indirectly by summation, with the 
logarithmic function resulting. In spite of continuous controversy 
resulting from this first law of psychophysics, its importance cannot 
be overlooked for it provided the initial basis for, and gave impetus 
to "mental" measurement.
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It has been said that "more than 99 per cent of all work dealing 
with problems of scaling, or with the application of scaling methods to 
psychological problems, has been published since 1950 . . . "  (Ekman & 
SjOberg, 1965, p. 451). This modern development has almost exclusively 
followed two courses, Thurstonian indirect scaling and Stevens' direct 
scaling.
Thurstone
It remained for L. L. Thurstone to bring the domain of Fechner's 
psychophysics into the areas of attitudes and opinions (Stevens, 1966a). 
Whereas previously, psychophysics had been the tool of academic psychol­
ogy with interest in the determination of sensory thresholds primarily, 
Thurstone extended the methods into areas of broader interests. In 
addition to practical application, Thurstone extended psychophysics to 
nonmetric stimuli, that is, to those stimuli for which no physical mea­
surement was available.
Fechner's jnd scale can be said to be a confusion scale since 
"the basic operation for determining the steps along the scale is the 
assessment of equal degrees of confusion on the observer's response" 
(Stevens, 1966a, p. 532). Thurstone perceived the fact that if dis­
persions or confusion can be used to create scales in psychophysics, 
it can also be used in other contexts. Thurstone's law of comparative 
judgment provides a method whereby units of variability are transformed 
into scale, values. It represents the second development in scaling 
methodology, and has been referred to as the second psychophysical law 
(Guilford, 1954), Thus, Thurstone and Fechner have developed similar 
laws in that they employed measures of confusion assuming "equally
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often noticed differences are equal" whether in terms of jnd's or dis- 
criminal dispersions. Ekman and Sjoberg (1965) and Ekman (1967) 
describes Thurstonian procedures as those requiring only a minimal 
amount of information from the subject, essentially only a rank order 
decision (e.g., pair comparison judgments of greater than or less than). 
In order to derive a scale, then, certain assumptions are necessary.
One assumption, as noted earlier, was that discriminal dispersions are 
constant throughout the scale. Other assumptions are also concerned 
with variability; for example, over trials for a given subject or, more 
commonly, over subjects for a given trial. From this point of view, 
Thurstonian methods are closely related to test theory. "In fact these 
methods can be regarded as an extension and generalization of test 
theory to the class of subjective continuum" (Ekman, 1967, p. 28). 
Thurstonian categorical procedures are thus indirect and attempt to 
unitize dispersion similar to Fechner’s method. They represent an 
extension of scaling to "interesting stimuli" (Stone, 1968d) and to 
nonmetric stimuli.
Stevens
The second, modern development in scaling methodology is seen in 
S. S. Steven's power law. It represents the most recent development and 
has been designated as the third psychophysical law (Stone, 1968c). 
Stevens (1957) argues that equally often noticed differences are not 
equal, but that the general law relating subjective magnitude to stim­
ulus magnitude is that equal stimulus ratios produce equal subjective 
ratios. This relationship of subjective magnitude increasing with 
physical magnitude is the culmination of extensive empirical evidence,
6
and "as an experimental fact, the power law is established beyond any 
reasonable doubt, possibly more firmly established than anything else 
in psychology" (Ekman & Sjoberg, 1965, p. 467). The power law is 
believed by some psychologists to have replaced Fechner's logarithmic 
law.
Ekman and Sjoberg (1965) and Ekman (1967) describe Stevens' 
procedures as being basically simple, with the subject providing the 
burden for scale construction via estimates, with scale development 
following directly. The subject's empirical data is averaged and the 
scale is constructed. Thus, these methods are described as direct, 
since they are all based on the individual subject's quantitative 
estimates of subjective relations, and they form a class of "estima­
tion methods" (Ekman & Sjoberg, 1965, p. 452). The assumption involved 
in these methods is that the subject is capable of reporting quantita­
tive relations between subjective experiences without serious system­
atic error (Ekman, 1967). A convenient check of this assumption is 
provided by estimating the internal consistency of the subject's data. 
Stevens' estimation methods, in comparison to Thurstonian categorical 
methods: (1) avoid the problem of using confusion as the unit of mea­
surement for the developed scale, (2) do not assert that dispersions 
are equal throughout the scale, (3) are procedures which obtain infor­
mation directly from the subject, thus avoiding many complex mathemati­
cal assumptions. As Stevens (1958) states: "Despite the ingenuity of 
modern instrumentation, many tasks of rating, grading and judging can 
still best be done by two-legged meters" (p. 194).
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Scalable Continua
Stevens (1957) points out that scalable continua may be divided 
into two types: prothetic and metathetic. The prothetic continuum 
deals with "how much" and may be seen to include judgments of length, 
area and weight to list a few (Stevens and Galanter, 1957). This con­
tinuum is thus seen to be a quantitative one. The metathetic continuum, 
a qualitative one, refers to "what kind" and "where." Examples of scal­
able dimensions include visual position, visual inclination and pitch 
(Stevens and Galanter, 1957). Stevens suggests that prothetic or Class 
I continua are mediated by an additive physiological process, while meta­
thetic or Class II continua are mediated by a substitutive physiological 
process. While this underlying physiological difference is speculative, 
Stevens lists four functional criteria which facilitate the distinction 
between Class I and Class II phenomena.
The first criterion is the subjective size of the jnd. For a 
Class I continuum, the subjective size of the jnd increases as one goes 
up the scale. While Fechner assumed an equality of jnd's throughout 
the scale, Stevens points out that this is not empirically found. Thus, 
summation of jnd's under Fechnerian procedure is not a valid means for 
producing a scale. Class II continua represent the case where jnd's 
are approximately equal in subjective size. Thus, distinction between 
the two perceptual continua is possible by subjective size of the jnd.
The second criterion mentioned by Stevens deals with the form 
of the relationship when indirect category scales are plotted against 
direct ratio scales. On the prothetic continuum, the form of the rela­
tionship is concave downward when category scales are plotted against
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ratio scales. For the metathetic continuum, the obtained relationship 
may be linear. An explanation for the concave down function is offered 
in terms of the differential discriminability of the subject. At the 
upper end of the continuum, where stimuli are less easy to detect, cate­
gories are broader and discriminability is lessened, hence the resultant 
concave down function is obtained.
A third criterion to aid in distinguishing prothetic and meta­
thetic continua is the time-order error which refers to the fact that 
the second of two equal stimuli tends to be judged greater than the 
first. This error is characteristic of judgments on the prothetic con­
tinuum and is not found on the metathetic continuum. Again, differen­
tial sensitivity in discrimination of lower and upper ends of a con­
tinuum (decreasing ability as one goes up) is offered as an explanation 
of the observed results.
The final criterion to distinguish Class I and Class II con­
tinua is hysteresis or a lagging behind which is observed "when the 
apparent sense-distances between successive stimuli are judged in dif­
ferent orders" (Stevens, 1957, p. 159). Hysteresis is hypothesized to 
occur for Class I continua but not for Class II; however, this is only 
a suggestion, and not a conclusive criterion.
Recently, the Class I - Class II dichotomy has been questioned 
as being too sharp a distinction and Eisler (1963) has substituted the 
term "protheticness" to indicate that the distinction between the two 
types of continua may not always be dichotomous but rather a matter of 
degree.
The distinction between the two continua is important since 
"all procedures of Fechnerian extraction, like the method of pair
9
comparisons and its related technique which seek to build scales out of 
'unitized' measures of dispersion, are not proper methods for scaling 
magnitudes that behave like Class I or prothetic continua" (Stevens,
1957, p. 178). The evidence for this statement is seen in the first 
criterion mentioned above which indicates that Class I phenomena do not 
demonstrate equal jnd's up the scale as Fechner and Thurstone assumed in 
their procedural derivations. Since these methods are inadequate,
Stevens suggests four methods to directly assess psychological magnitude 
production and magnitude estimation. The latter is perhaps the most con­
venient due to ease of construction and validation of the scale and is 
the most widely used (Stevens, 1966a). Of course, these methods can also 
be appropriately used on the Class II continuum. Prothetic-metathetic 
continua have been distinguished both for metric (Stevens and Galanter, 
1957) and non-metric stimuli (Stevens, 1966a, Kiinnapas and Sillen, 1964, 
Stone, 1966) using these methods.
Advantages of Direct Estimation
In addition to the previously mentioned advantages of direct 
estimation procedures in comparison with the indirect methods, several 
other considerations should be noted. In the first place, direct esti­
mation procedures yield a ratio scale of measurement obtained from the 
subject, which allows one to perform any mathematical manipulation of 
the data. In comparison to only the rank order information obtained 
with categorical methods, this is indeed an advantage. Secondly, con­
text affects (extraneous or contaminating variables) are easily mini­
mized in direct scaling methods and these methods are less influenced 
by stimulus spacing, landmarks, or differential familiarity. In fact,
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Stevens and Galanter (1957) state that the ratio scale is relatively 
unaffected by stimulus spacing.
Thus, it may be concluded that the direct estimation methods are 
both most valid and the easiest to use in measurement of subjective reac­
tions and as Stevens (1966a) observes: "for those who must build their 
science on one or another consensus of human judgment, a way seems open 
for an effective quantification" (p. 540).
Clinical Judgment and Clinical Psychophysics
One area in psychology in which judgment has a prominent role is 
clinical psychology. The importance of such judgment in making evalua­
tive and diagnostic decisions regarding an individual has contributed to 
increased efforts to study the reliability and validity of clinical judg­
ment. Especially within the last 20 years, the topic of clinical judg­
ment has been the focus of increasing research interest (Goldberg, 1968).
Previously, clinical judgment had not been regarded as an area in 
which empirical data could be collected, connotated by such descriptive 
terms as "clinical intuition" which seemed to designate clinical judgment 
as a special means of knowledge different from the ordinary process of 
human judgment. However, as Hunt and Jones (1962) point out, history 
has refuted the notion that intuition cannot be empirically investigated. 
As this somewhat vague and empirically untenable explanation has declined, 
more moderate phrases such as clinical judgment or clinical decision were 
substituted, and presently clinical judgment is regarded as a "natural 
behavioral phenomenon open to all the investigative procedures of experi­
mental psychology" (p. 28). Some investigators (Goldberg, 1965; Meehl, 
1959) have taken the position that the subjective clinical judgment
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process cannot compete efficiently and validly with actuarial procedures. 
This notion has resulted in the continuing controversy of clinical versus 
actuarial prediction which is a lively area of research today (Goldberg, 
1968). However, Hunt and Jones (1962) present reasons why this ideal­
istic goal of actuarial prediction is presently unattainable in clinical 
psychology, and conclude along with Stevens (1958) that the "two-legged 
meter" (p. 194) can still best accomplish the judging and rating tasks 
despite modern computer methods.
Stone (1968c) writes that there has been a long history of 
exchange between the clinical and psychophysical areas of psychology 
which has not been generally recognized. Historically, Binet (1905), 
using the logic of psychophysics, substituted mental age for threshold 
intensity in developing his intelligence test. "Also, for years, psy­
chophysical procedures-methods have been used in clinical audiometric 
and visual testing" (Stone, 1968c, p. 162).
The first experimenters to seriously or explicitly apply the
psychophysical analogy in the area of clinical judgment were Hunt and
Jones (1962). In attempting to find a model or method of approach to
investigate clinical judgment, Hunt and Jones (1962) related clinical
and psychophysical judgment in the following manner:
They are merely the opposite poles of a rough continuum, a quan­
titative continuum marked by the clarity and specificity with 
which the stimuli are defined, by the degree to which the judg­
mental setting is standardized through careful control of the 
known pertinent variables and the elimination of extraneous cues, 
and by the provision of uniform modes of reporting or response 
that lend themselves to convenient mathematical treatment (p. 34).
Hunt and Jones considered their analogy beneficial to increasing under­
standing of the clinical judgment process, and their efforts centered 
about three areas; stimulus identification, the judgment situation, and 
categories of report.
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A limitation of their work, however can be seen in that they used 
category scales. For example, Hunt (1960) correlated the rank orderings 
of twelve schizophrenics with a 7 point category scale concerning amount 
of schizophrenia. These quantitative measures afford only an ordinal 
level of measurement, whereas, all three developments in scaling method­
ology yield at least interval measurement.
This psychophysical analogy initiated by Hunt and Jones (1962) 
has not exerted a great influence on the majority of research conducted 
on clinical judgment. Current research efforts have mainly centered 
around the following areas: First, accuracy of the judgmental process, 
including reliability and validity; and secondly, simulation of the 
judgmental process (Goldberg, 1968). Goldberg, summarizing the findings 
of many studies, concludes that clinical judgment is: (1) rather unre­
liable in the sense that while judges are consistent within their own 
judgments over time, they show poor consensus on these judgments between 
themselves; and (2) rather low in validity on an absolute basis, as 
exemplified by the fact that amount of professional training, experience 
of the judge, and amount of information do not relate to judgmental accu­
racy. It is for these reasons that actuarial prediction, "which can be 
constructed to perform at a level of validity no lower than that of the 
clinical expert" (p. 485), has risen to such prominence and has become 
the increasing focus of current clinical judgment studies.
Simulation of the judgmental process has stemmed from Meehl's 
(1959) contention that a configural utilization of available cues may 
be the advantage of the clinician, in comparison to the linear repre­
sentation usually obtained by actuarial formulae. This area has
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received the attention of the most recent investigations of clinical judg­
ment and, as yet, is unresolved.
At present, the major effort to apply the psychophysical analogy 
to clinical judgment can be seen in the research of Stone and his asso­
ciates. His work has progressed along two lines, the use of indirect 
(Thurstonian) procedures and direct (Stevens') procedures. In an early 
investigation, Sinnett and Stone (1965) attempted to measure (scale) 
intelligence, according to one of the three major psychophysical laws. 
Noting that intelligence has been widely accepted as measured by an 
interval scale, Sinnett and Stone explored whether this same metric 
would apply to the psychological or judgmental domain. They hypoth­
esized that the equal intervals from different ranges of intelligence 
would be judged unequal, that boundaries of intellectual categories 
would influence judgments and that intervals from higher ranges of 
intelligence would be judged larger than equal intervals from lower 
ranges. The study essentially confirmed these predictions. They 
employed Thurstonian pair-comparisons and they reported that the judg­
mental viewpoint of intelligence is perceived as a series of unequal, 
ordered categories, with unequal but interval scale measurement within 
categories. Thus, the psychological scale of intelligence was found to 
differ from the overt IQ scale. It should also be noted that high con­
sistency was found in each subject's judgments and between each subject 
indicating a "shared judgmental frame of reference" (p. 905).
Indirect Thurstonian scaling was also used in investigating 
whether college professors perceive academic grade intervals as con­
forming to the equal interval scale which is customarily assumed
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(Stone and Sinnett, 1968). Again judges showed high internal consistency 
in their judgments, and high agreement between themselves. Discrepancies 
between the assumed equal interval scale and the judgmental perception of 
this scale were found, in that intervals were perceived unequal through­
out the scale, and comparable intervals become larger with ascending 
scale values. A replication of this study was conducted by Stone (1969a) 
using freshman college students as judges. Comparable results were 
obtained in that there was a discrepancy between the subjective scale 
and the assumed equal interval scale. Thus, again in these investiga­
tions, the judgmental scale did not conform to the overt scale measure­
ment .
Continuing his research on clinical judgments, Stone (1966) 
investigated psychiatrists' prognostic judgments regarding functional 
psychotic disorders by means of indirect measures (pair-comparisons). 
Stone found sufficient agreement among his judges for prognostic judg­
ments of psychiatric diagnostic categories to enable an interval scale 
(Case V) to be developed. The finding that the judges’ impressions of 
the functional psychoses were reliable, in seeming contrast to the find­
ings of unreliability of diagnostic categories (Goldberg, 1968), has 
seemed to indicate that along a single judgmental dimension (prognosis) 
reliability may be high, whereas the "low reliability in psychiatric 
diagnosis involve tasks which require judgment along unknown multidi­
mensions" (Stone, 1966, p. 119). The "prog" scale (Stone, 1966) was 
then compared against reported improvement rates and found to have 
superficial validity.
In a subsequent study, Stone (1967) attempted to validate fur­
ther the prog scale. Results of this study suggest that the prog scale
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was meaningfully related to improvement, recovery, and length of hospi­
talization rates associated with the diagnostic categories. The scale 
was also related to patient test scores on a number of MMPI scales 
(Stone, 1965) .
Stone (1968a) extended the psychophysical scaling analogy of the 
opinions and judgments of psychiatrists by computing traditional psycho­
physical concepts (e.g., difference limens, point of subjective equality, 
and interval of uncertainty) with which to better describe the prog scale. 
Although not used in this investigation, Stone suggests that the direct- 
estimate methods of scaling might be preferred when the present stimuli 
(functional psychoses) were used.
Direct estimation procedures (magnitude estimation) were employed 
by Stone and Skurdal (1968) to investigate psychiatrists' judgments of 
prognosis for fifteen psychosis labels. Judged prognosis was found to 
constitute a prothetic continuum. The notion that equally often noticed 
differences are not equal was also verified as variability increased with 
subjective magnitude. The Thurstonian category scale and the magnitude 
estimation scale were found to be exponentially related.
More recently, Stone (1968b) found this same judgmental ratio 
scale to "exhibit rather remarkable power function relations with three 
different validity criterion: average improvement rates under psychi­
atric drug treatment, length of stay in state mental hospitals, and 
admission age (to state mental hospitals)" (Stone, 1968d, p. 194)
Whereas the previous studies dealt with a judged prognosis scale, 
Stone (1968d) attempted to see if impairment severity judgments could 
also be shown to demonstrate similar relations to several validity
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criteria. The magnitude estimations indicated the continuum underlying 
this judgment was prothetic. Also, impairment severity was related to 
several validity criteria by power functions. Stone concludes that 
based on his studies, "the psychophysical law suggested by Stevens may 
be quite appropriate to consider when studying the mechanisms and phe­
nomena of clinical judgment" (p. 198).
Based on the 'psychophysical analogy of Hunt and Jones, and 
extended by Stone, it seems as if the methods of psychophysics, espe­
cially direct estimation procedures, are indeed applicable when attempt­
ing to quantify a consensus of clinical judgments. Until recently this 
analogy has been neglected with efforts directed to the simulation of 
clinical judgments and the development of actuarial procedures, because 
of the previously reported unreliability and invalidity of clinical 
judgments. However, the results of Stone's efforts suggest that judg­
ments can be made reliably both between judges and within the same 
judge, and that these judgments possess validity. As Stone (1966) 
observed, when asked to judge on a one dimensional continuum (prog­
nosis or impairment severity) the results are scalable, reliable and 
valid in contrast to the multidimensional aspects of diagnostic cate­
gorizing. In short, "when properly measured, a viable and valid consen­
sus seems to appear out of this morass of subjectivity" (Stone, 1968c, 
p. 199).
Clinical Judgment and the MMPI
As mentioned above, investigations of clinical judgments have 
been predominantly concerned with the accuracy of the clinician and 
with attempts to simulate how he makes his judgments. The studies 
which have used the MMPI are no exception to this trend.
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For clinical purposes, one of the more widely used tests with 
adolescents and adults is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven­
tory (MMPI) (Rotter, 1964). The popularity of the MMPI appears to rest 
upon its unusual validity. This validity is indicated by the fact that 
60 to 70 percent of mentally disturbed or handicapped adults will pro­
duce profiles judged to be representative of the kind and severity of 
the disability, while supposedly normal persons will show such profiles 
10 to 20 percent of the time (Hathaway, 1965).
Studies comparing the validity of prediction from actuarial use 
of the MMPI and the clinician's judgment of it are frequently present 
in the literature. Meehl (1959) indicates that actuarial prediction is 
superior to the average clinician in making an accurate diagnosis of 
illness, and indeed, is equivalent to the best clinician. Subsequently, 
Goldberg (1965) compared the diagnosis of psychosis or neurosis from 
both the clinician and the MMPI signs. Having sorted protocols from 
each of seven psychiatric samples on an eleven point forced normal dis­
tribution from least to most psychotic, each clinical judge was instructed 
to draw a cutting line indicating where he thought the diagnosis of psy­
chosis began to preponderate. The clinician's diagnosis was then compared 
with several actuarial signs used in scoring the MMPI (i.e., scale eleva­
tions). Goldberg found that a number of relatively simple actuarial 
indexes were more accurate than the best clinician. Cook (1967a) simi­
larly found that the MMPI formula scoring resulted in more reliable diag­
nosis than the clinician, and Cook (1967b) reported much variability in 
the clinical judgment, where the judge with the highest validity on one 
sample was not highest over all samples. Thus, the actuarial scoring of
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the MMPI is more accurate in diagnosing psychosis and neurosis when com 
pared with clinical judgment based on the MMPI protocol. This finding 
has been replicated many times which Goldberg (196S) summarizes. Much 
of this line of investigation has been directed toward the relationship 
of predictors and criterion, rather than to the determination of how 
the clinician himself perceives the data. As Stone (1966) noted previ-r
ously, the unreliability of a multidimensional diagnosis such as psycho 
sis versus neurosis is often demonstrated; however, when single dimen­
sional decisions are asked of the clinician, both reliability and valid 
ity of judgments are evidenced.
Another large area of research on clinical judgment using the 
MMPI has focused on how the clinician processes the data; in short, 
simulation of the "hidden cognitive processes of the clinician as he 
makes his judgments" (Goldberg, 1968, p. 485). This area encompasses 
the controversy concerning linear versus configural utilization of 
cues. Meehl (1959) stated that the clinician may have an advantage 
over actuarial prediction in his ability to use cues configurally, 
that is, to be able to "discriminate quite complex and subtle higher- 
order patternings reflected in the visual profile form" (p. 106), and 
to vary optimal weightings for different cues depending on the situa­
tion. This initial speculation has stimulated much controversy on how 
the clinician utilizes cues.
Kleinmuntz (1963) had clinicians "think aloud" as they judged 
profiles, and constructed a computer program to simulate these verbal­
izations. He found that a complex sequential representation most ade­
quately depicted the clinical judgment process. Goldberg (1965), on
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the other hand, found that a simple linear combination of scale scores 
from the MMPI was more accurate than configural models (i.e., Meehl- 
Dahlstrom Rules). Goldberg (1968) concludes that "the linear model 
provided an excellent representation of the judgments of most of these 
clinicians, even for a task which they believed to be a highly config­
ural one" (p. 491).
Oskamp (1967) points out, however, that \Miile the clinicians' 
judgments may be reproduced by a linear additive combination of pre­
dictor variables, this does not necessarily mean that the clinician 
actually employed such a linear method. In an effort to further delin­
eate the clinical judgment process, Wiggins and Hoffman (1968) attempted 
to apply three simulation models (linear, quadratic and sign) to clini­
cal judgments of psychotic versus neurotic. They conclude that config- 
urality was a consistent judgmental characteristic distinguishing 16 of 
29 judges. Mention was also made that judges tended to be more config­
ural for some samples than others, and they cautioned that although the 
difference between linear and configural judges are reliable, "their 
magnitude is not large" (p. 77).
The present study was undertaken to determine how the experi­
enced clinician perceives the MMPI. Since previous research has dealt 
with multidimensional diagnosis or simulation of judgments of the 
clinician, the need exists to examine specifically the relationship 
between the MMPI and the clinical judgment. It is felt that the 
psychophysical analogy has proven sufficiently valid in quantifying 
clinical judgment, and the present study extends this analogy into 
work with the MMPI. Stone (1968c) has shown that the use of direct
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estimation procedures produces a valid measurement of judgment along uni­
dimensional continua and that the judges are able to give consistent and 
reliable judgments. This measurement is at a supposed ratio level when 
direct procedures are used. Thus, it is felt that direct estimation 
procedures, specifically magnitude estimation, are applicable in the 
present investigation. In an effort to determine the relationship 
between clinical ju&gments and MMPI scales, and to describe this rela­
tionship, the present study will attempt: (1) to scale the degree of 
importance of the ten basic MMPI scales (Rs-1 to Si-0) in providing 
information concerning degree of pathology, (2) to explore the rela­
tionship between the overtly equal interval measurement of each basic 
scale (Hs-1 to Si-0) to the perceived, subjective judgments of each 
scale, again in terms of degree of pathology, (3) to equate the sub­
jective pathology levels for the ten basic scales, and (4) to find 
the point, or threshold, at which the MMPI is considered invalid 
using the validity scales (? to K) by means of the classical psycho­




Judgments were obtained from 32 clinical psychologists employed 
in the states of Minnesota (14) and Kansas (18). Subjects (Ss) from 
Minnesota were enlisted for participation in the study through the 
cooperation obtained from a psychologist in the Minneapolis area. They 
were all experienced clinicians with whom he was familiar. Minnesota 
psychologists were associated with the Fort Snelling Veterans Adminis- ' 
tration Hospital, the University of Minnesota Hospital and Psychology 
Department, and Augsburg College. j5s from Kansas were contacted by mail 
concerning their participation in the study. Twenty-eight psychologists 
listed in the Kansas Psychological Association directory were contacted, 
of whom 18 agreed to participate. Kansas psychologists were associated 
with the Kansas State University, the Topeka Veterans Administration 
Hospital, the Menninger Foundation, the University of Kansas, and the 
Wadsworth Veterans Administration Hospital. All Ss indicating their 
willingness to cooperate were contacted on an individual basis by the 
investigator. Thus, the final selection of Ss was in no way random.
The mean chronological age for Ss was 41 years, with the range 
of age from 29 to 72 years. Their mean number of years experience in 
the use of the MMPI was 9 years, with the range from 5 to 19 years.
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Ss administered the MMPI to an average of 74 percent of their patients, 
ranging from 15 percent to 100 percent. Thus, judges had many years 
experience with the MMPI, and one would expect their clinical judgment 
to be seasoned and well considered.
Stimuli
The presentrstudy consisted of four parts. Stimuli for parts 
I and II of the investigation consisted of the basic MMPI scale names 
(Hs-1 to Si-0). Stimuli for part III of the study were T-scores deter­
mined for each basic scale. T-scores for scales Hs-1 to Ma-9 were 
presented in intervals of five, beginning with 30 and ending with 110. 
For the Si-0 scale, the range of T-scores was from 30 to 100 inclusive, 
since it is not possible to receive a T-score above 100 on this scale. 
The T-score of 50 was not included in the range of stimuli to be 
judged, since this particular score constitutes the middle range or 
most "usual" score obtained and presumably would not be associated 
with any degree of pathology. Thus, on the D-2 scale for example, 
fifteen T-scores in intervals of five ranging from 30 to 110 were 
presented to each S, and so on, for the remaining nine scales.
Stimuli for the fourth part of the experiment were taken from the 
validity scales. For the ? and L scales, raw scores were presented 
to each Sh The range of stimulus values for the ? scale was from 
10 to 130, presented in intervals of ten. For the L scale, values 
ranged from 0 to 15, with an interval of one between each stimulus. 
T-scores from 30 to 80 in intervals of five constituted the stimuli
for the F and K scales.
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A brief description of each MMPI scale taken from Dahlstrom and
Welsh (1960, pp. 43-85) is as follows:
? Scale: This is the Cannot Say score, and represents 
those items left unanswered. The distribution of this 
scale for normal subjects is positively skewed to an 
extreme degree (modal value of zero and median of one).
L Scale: This scale of fifteen items includes content 
involving aggressive feelings, bad thoughts, temptations, 
and lack of control. It is assumed that most people will 
endorse these items as applicable to themselves even 
though the items deal with disapproved actions and feel­
ings.
F Scale: Sixty-four items comprise this scale which is a 
measure of response conformity. Many items deal with 
peculiar thoughts and beliefs, while others deal with 
apathy and a lack of interest in things.
K Scale: The most recently developed of the validity 
scales is a measure of test-taking attitude appearing 
either as personal defensiveness or as exhibition of 
personal defects. There are thirty items on this scale.
Hs-1 Scale: This scale represents an attempt to measure 
personality characteristics related to the neurotic pat­
tern of hypochondriasis. The thirty-three items com­
prising this scale deal with a variety of bodily com­
plaints, as well as, with complaints about sleep and 
peculiarities of sensation.
D-2 Scale: The second of the basic scales, with sixty 
items, is designed to measure the depth of the clinical 
symptom pattern of depression. The items deal with gen­
eral apathy and a distinct denial of happiness or per­
sonal worth.
Hy-3 Scale: This scale was developed to aid in identi­
fication of patients using the neurotic defenses of the 
conversion form of hysteria. There are sixty items on 
this scale falling into the categories of somatic and 
social facility.
Pd-4 Scale: Developed to measure asocial persons with 
psychopathic personality disorders (psychopathic devi­
ates) , these fifty items are concerned with reflecting 
the alienation of the person from his family and the 
extension of his difficulties to authorities in gen­
eral.
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Mf-5 Scale: The fifth basic scale was designed to iden­
tify personality features related to the disorder of male 
sexual inversion. Its sixty items deal with interest in 
kinds of work, social activities, religious preferences, 
and frankly sexual material.
Pa-6 Scale: This scale evaluates the clinical pattern of 
paranoia. The forty items comprising this scale deal with 
the admission of psychological fragility and are consist­
ent with the text book descriptions of paranoia.
Pt-7 Scale: Designed to evaluate the neurotic pattern of 
psychasthenia, or the obsessive-compulsive syndrome, the 
content of these forty-eight items deals with anxiety, 
self-doubts, and moodiness.
Sc-8 Scale: The psychotic pattern of schizophrenia is 
the focus of this scale, with seventy-eight items reflect­
ing bizarre mentation, social alienation, feelings of per­
secution, and poor family relationships.
Ma-9 Scale: The personality pattern for which this scale 
was derived is hypomania. The content of its forty-six 
items includes activity, level, moral attitudes, and 
family relationships.
Si-0 Scale: Social introversion is investigated in this 
scale, with the content areas of uneasiness in social 
situations, insecurity, and worry covered in its seventy 
items.
The items comprising each of the basic scales (with the excep­
tion of the Mf-5 and Si-0 scales) were selected on the basis of empiri­
cal separations between normally adjusted subjects and various psychi­
atric cases. Further description of the samples and validation methods 
can be found in Welsh and Dahlstrom (1956). Some of the basic scales 
have a K correction factor added to them. This K factor is known to be 
relatively independent of the clinical personality variables measured 
by each basic scale, and relates closely to defensiveness and psycho­
logical exhibitionism. The weights of K to be added were determined 
empirically on selected samples in a psychiatric setting and they 
improve the operation of the scales by suppressing nonvalid variance
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(Dahlstroro and Welsh, 1960). The present study included the K correction 
for those scales requiring it when they were used as stimuli.
Each stimulus presentation to be judged was presented on an indi­
vidual piece of 8 1/2 x 11 inch paper. At the top of this paper were 
the instructions for the judgmental task. Attached to this sheet were
the various random orderings of the stimuli. Each stimulus, along with
r
the standard, was on an independent slip of paper; these slips were 
attached to the larger sheet so that following a judgment, each J3 would 
turn the slip and the next stimulus was exposed. This procedure was 
employed in an attempt to insure that each judgment would be independent 
of the preceding judgments.
Procedure
The general instructions were patterned after Stevens (1966a) 
and Stone and Skurdal (1968). A MMPI profile summary sheet was pro­
vided for each jS, since it is present in a normal setting when S_ makes 
his judgments. Each S_ was presented with the following general instruc­
tions enclosed in a hard bound notebook:
We would appreciate your cooperation in an experiment 
which will take approximately 30 minutes of your time.
This is not an experiment to assess the accuracy or 
correctness of clinicians' judgments. Rather, it is 
an attempt to quantify expert judgments pertaining to 
the MMPI scales. We are cognizant of the fact that 
some of the judgmental material presented in this study 
will be unusual in the sense that you would typically 
consider them in relation to some other data. However, 
we ask that you suspend this process for the present, 
and make your judgments solely on the data presented 
on each individual slip of paper. We will ask you to 
make judgments concerning degree of importance of the 
MMPI scales, degree of pathology reflected in the scale 
scores, and finally, validity of the profile. Your judg­
ments will be based on a hypothetical patient described 
in the clinical history on the following page.
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We ask that you make your judgments proportional to a 
standard which has been set to assist you in making 
your judgments. For example, below you will find three 
lines of different lengths. Note that the standard has 
been assigned the number 50. Now compare the length of 
line A with the standard, and judge its length propor­
tional to the standard. If you think it is three times 
as long you should put the number 150 (3 X 50) in the 
space provided. Now for line B, also judge its length 





Your figures were probably close to 100 for line A, 35- 
40 for line B, and 75-80 for line C, since the standard 
is 2 inches long, line A is 4 inches long, line B is 1% 
inches long, and line C is 3 inches long.
Clinical History
The hypothetical patient is a thirty-year-old married 
Caucasian male who comes to you for psychological eval­
uation. He is alert, responsive, and cooperative. He 
has some college and has no history of psychiatric hos­
pitalization. The validity scales of the MMPI are 
within normal limits, and the K correction has been 
applied to those scales requiring it.
In the following pages you will first observe the scale 
names and then MMPI scale scores. Your first task will 
be to judge importance for the 10 basic scales in pro­
viding information concerning pathology exhibited by 
the patient. You will be presented with a series of 
MMPI scales in irregular order. To assist you in mak­
ing your judgments, the importance of the scale which 
was chosen to be the standard has been arbitrarily set 
at 50. You are to assign numbers in such a way that 
they reflect your subjective impression of importance 
(in providing information pertinent to pathology) pro­
portional to the standard. For example, if the Sc-8 
scale seems to provide 10 times more information about 
pathology than the standard scale (Pd-4) you would put 
the number 500 in the space provided. If it seems one- 
fifth as important, you would place the number 10 in 
the space. For the remaining comparison situations you 
may use any number you wish, fractions, whole numbers,
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or decimals; however, please do not use the number zero.
Be sure to make each assignment proportional to the stan­
dard scale stimulus represented by the number 50. Please 
try to make each judgment independent of the previous 
ones by simply turning the slip over after you have made 
3'our judgment. To assure independence, we ask that you 
do not look back at any of your previous judgments.
Your second task will be to judge the degree of pathology 
believed to be associated with a MMPI scale score. Again, 
make your judgments proportional to the standard provided. 
For example on the Hy-3 scale, if you feel an Hy-3 T-score 
of 75 reflects twice the degree of pathology as compared 
to the standard, an Hy T-score of 60 (indicating the 
degree of pathology of 50), you would put - the number 100 
in the space provided. Judgments will be obtained for 
each of the basic scales in a similar manner.
Your third task will be to make judgments pertaining to 
the validity of a MMPI profile when presented with scores 
from each of the four validity scales. For example, if 
there is a T-score of 60 on the F scale, would you con­
sider the profile to be valid or invalid? Assume that 
the other three validity scales (?, L, K) are within 
normal limits. Raw scores constitute the stimuli for 
the ? and L scales, and T-scores are used for the F and 
K scales.
The MMPI profile summary sheet is provided for your con­
venience.
We will be happy to provide you with a pre-publication 
copy of the study as soon as the data has been tabulated.
Would you please supply the following information about 
yourself:
Male _____ Female _____
Number of years experience with the MMPI _____ 
Percentage of patients to whom you
administer the MMPI _____
Chronological age
Year when received Ph.D. _____
Where received degree _____
Part I
Ss were asked to make magnitude estimations concerning the 
degree of importance of the basic MMPI scales (Hs-1 to Si-0) in pro­
viding information pertinent to pathology. After comparing Oskamp's
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(1967) empirical weightings of the MMPI scales which contributed the
greatest influence toward clinical decision making with the subjective
weightings given by each judge, it was decided that the Pd~4 scale
represented a scale which was moderately influential in providing
information. Therefore, the Pd-4 scale was used as the standard for
the present magnitude estimations and was assigned a value of 50.
(
This modulus enabled each S_ to use a wide range of numbers above and
below this value. The selection of a standard from the middle range
of stimuli to be judged and the assignment of an appropriate modulus
as presently done avoids some of the methodological problems mentioned
by Poulton (1968). Each S_ received a different randomly determined
sequential presentation of the nine stimuli and judged each stimulus
presented once. The specific instructions S_s received were:
We are aware that the judgment of the ten basic scales 
alone, without consideration of the whole profile, 
represents a somewhat artificial situation. However, 
we are asking you to suspend the "usual" situation and 
base your judgments of each scale in reference to the 
standard scale (Pd-4). Please remember to make each 
judgment proportional to the standard (Pd-4) provided 
on each sheet, and in relation to the hypothetical 
patient described.
Part II
Ss were asked to select a T-score value for each basic scale 
which indicated the same degree of pathology as the standard. A Pd-4 
T-score of 70 was selected as the standard and assigned the value of 
50 indicating degree of pathology. This T-score represents empirically 
two standard deviations from the mean of the T distribution, and is 
considered to be a critical point when evaluating pathology on each 
scale. Each jS was then asked to provide a T-score for each of the
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nine remaining scales which was subjectively equal to this standard.
The actual instructions were:
With a T-score of 70 on the Pd~4 scale, the degree of 
pathology indicated is 50. For each scale below would 
you please indicate what T-score. value would be neces­
sary to reflect the same degree of pathology (a pathol­
ogy value of 50). Remember to use T-scores.
Part III (
An attempt was made to investigate the perceived degree of 
pathology evidenced by T-scores for each of the basic scales. The 
T-score of 60 on each scale was chosen as the standard and assigned 
the value of 25, representing the degree of pathology. Since the 
standard selected in this part and the previously employed modulus 
of 50 are numerically close, a more discrepant modulus value of 25 
was assigned in an effort to avoid confusion among the judges.
Stimuli were presented to each S in a random order, and magnitude 
estimations were obtained for the stimuli (T-scores from 30 to 110) 
on each of the ten basic scales. Judgments for each scale were pre­
sented on a' separate sheet of paper. The instructions for each scale 
were:
We are aware that judgments of the (here the scale 
name was included) scale alone, without considera­
tion of the other scales, is a somewhat artificial 
situation. However, we are asking you to suspend 
the "usual" situation and base your judgments solely 
on the (name) scale. Please remember to make your 
judgments proportional to the standard (T-score of 
60) provided on each sheet, and in relation to the 
hypothetical patient described.
Part IV
The purpose of this part of the study was to discern that thres­
hold value, for each of the validity scales, beyond which the MMPI
profile was considered to be nonvalid for interpretation. By means of
the method of constant stimuli (Guilford, 1954), S_s made judgments of
valid or not valid for each of the randomly presented stimuli. Raw
scores constituted the stimuli for the ? and L scales since these are
more commonly used by psychologists when evaluating a profile, and
hence, seemed most appropriate to employ as stimuli. For the L and K
r
scales, T-scores are more typically evaluated, and were therefore used 
as stimuli in the present study. Instructions to each _S entailed ask­
ing him if he would consider the overall MMPI profile to be valid or 
not valid for interpretation with the validity scale score presented 
to him. Each JS was informed that the three validity scales on which 
he was not presently making judgments were within normal limits. The 
instructions presented for judgments of each validity scale were:
We are aware that judgments pertaining to the four 
validity scales alone, without consideration of the 
other scales, represents a somewhat artificial 
situation. However, we are asking you to suspend 
the usual situation and base your judgments solely 
on the (here the name of the particular scale was 
included) scale. You are to make judgments con­
cerning the validity or invalidity of the test pro­
file for interpretation when presented with a T- 




The present study represented an exploratory effort to investi- 
gate the relationship between clinical judgment and the basic and valid­
ity scales of the MMPI. Its purpose was to determine if any consistent 
relationship was apparent, and if so, to describe this relationship.
Each scale of the MMPI is coded and presented on the basis of a 
T-score distribution, having a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 
10. Although the T-scores were established judgmentally from the test 
authors' experience and not based upon empirically established means or 
standard deviations from normative groups (Dahlstrom and Welsh, I960), 
the scales are typically interpreted on the basis of this T-score dis­
tribution. In the present study, it was decided to examine the data 
with respect to the T-score mean of 50. Separate, but comparable, anal­
yses were conducted on the data below the T-score of 50 and on the data 
above the T-score of 50 for each basic MMPI scale. It was believed that 
this point of separation would not represent an artificial situation, 
and would, in fact, permit a more meaningful analysis of the data to be 
obtained. However, once analysis of the data had begun, it became appar­
ent that the data below the T-score of 50 would have to be further ana­
lyzed in a somewhat different fashion. This difference was suggested on 
the basis of overall interjudge agreement and on the basis of observed
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scale values. Consequently, the below 50 T-score data for each scale
was dichotomized into two groups in an effort to clarify the observed
results. One group, designated the Minnesota group, consisted of those
psychologists who had received their Ph.D. degree from the University
of Minnesota (N = 8), and those psychologists who had received their
degrees elsewhere, but were working in Minneapolis (N = 6). The second
<
group consisted of those psychologists who had received their degrees 
from the University of Kansas (N = 10) and those who had received their 
degrees elsewhere, but wete employed in Kansas (N_ = 8). None of the 
second group had received degrees from the University of Minnesota.
This group was designated the Kansas group. The two groups did not 
differ significantly in the number of years experience with the MMPI 
(Minnesota mean was 9.0 years, Kansas mean was 9.6 years, _t = .492), 
or in the percentage of patients to whom they administered the MMPI 
(Minnesota mean was 79%, Kansas mean was 70%, t_ = .863). This dichot­
omy, although an a posteriori decision, appeared to provide one mean­
ingful way .of attempting to understand the results of the judgments 
below the T-score of 50 for each scale.
The geometric means and quartiles for judgments concerning the 
degree of pathology evidenced by T-scores above 50 for each MMPI basic 
scale are presented in Appendix A. The scale values for judgments per­
taining to the degree of pathology associated with T-scores below 50 
are presented in Appendix B.
Judgmental Reliability
The presence and extent of interjudge reliability was assessed 
by means of the Kendall coefficient of concordance (W) corrected for
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ties (Siegel, 1956). A significant W may be interpreted as meaning that 
the judges are applying the same order in their judgments with respect 
to the stimuli under investigation. An additional measure of associa­
tion presented is the average Spearman rank correlation.
T-Scores below 50
Table 1 contains the values for the coefficient of concordance 
for each basic scale for stimuli below the T-score of 50. On four of 
the scales (Pd-4, MF-5, Pa-6, and Ma~9) interjudge agreement was found 
to be significant at the .05 level. However, on the remaining five 
scales (Hs-1, D-2, Iiy-3, Pt-7, and Sc-8) the judges failed to achieve 
significant agreement.
In an effort to discover if there was any pattern of judged 
agreement, or if the nonconcordance was randomly distributed, coef­
ficients were computed for the Minnesota and Kansas groups on each 
scale. For those four scales on which significant interjudge agree­
ment was noted at the .01 level, the two groups showed consistent 
agreement on only two scales, Pa-6 and Ma-9. For the remaining two 
scales, the Minnesota group did not show significant interjudge agree­
ment, while the Kansas group demonstrated agreement. The same pattern 
was also observed on the Si-0 scale where, although overall agreement 
resulted, the Minnesota'group showed non-significant agreement and the 
Kansas group agreed significantly among themselves.
Of the five scales in which no overall interjudge concordance 
was evident, only two, Hy-3 and Sc-8, showed a similar pattern when 
examining group agreement. Significant agreement was noted among the 
Minnesota group on the Hs-1 and D-2 scales, while no statistically
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TABLE 1
Coefficient of Concordance, js, P, and Average Spearman Rank 
Correlation Values for Judgments of T-Scores Below 50 For
Each Basic Scale
Scale W s P -̂Sav
Hs-1 .004 14.0 NS -.028
Minnesota .812 471.5 <.05 .798
Kansas .121 143.5 NS .069
D-2 .109 391.5 NS .080
Minnesota .058 31.5 NS -.014
Kansas .253 334.5 <.01 .209
Hy-3 .014 52.5 NS -.018
Minnesota .027 19.5 NS -.048
Kansas .102 121.5 NS .049
Pd-4 .275 1158.0 <.01 .252
Minnesota .118 82.5 NS .050
Kansas .455 667.5 <.01 .423
Mf-5 .283 1060.0 <.01 .260
Minnesota .234 157.5 NS .175
Kansas .339 421.0 <.01 .300
Pa-6 .470 2113.5 <.01 .485
Minnesota .554 430.5 <.01 .520
Kansas ‘ .425 650.5 <.01 .391
Pt-7 .088 367.5 NS .059
Minnesota .026 19.0 NS -.049
Kansas .204 288.5 <.01 .159
Sc-8 .019 62.0 NS -.013
Minnesota .030 18.5 NS -.045
Kansas .128 135.5 NS .077
Ma-9 .386 1613.5 <.01 .367
Minnesota .529 396.5 <.01 .493
Kansas .298 412.5 <.01 .257
Si-0 .142 570.0 <.05 .114
Minnesota .018 13.0 NS -.058
Kansas .325 429.5 <.01 .285
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significant agreement occurred in the Kansas group. However, on the 
Pt-7 scale, the Kansas group did show interjudge agreement while the 
Minnesota group did not.
In summary, then, the results indicate low but statistically
significant interjudge agreement on five scales, with nonsignificant
agreement found on the remaining five scales. However, when the data
(
is inspected with respect to group differences, a somewhat confusing 
pattern emerges, in that the two groups demonstrate inter-group con­
cordance on only four scales. The magnitude of the obtained coeffi­
cients must surely temper the results of further analysis of judgments 
concerning stimuli below the T-score of 50.
T-Scores Above 50
Judges demonstrated high agreement and consistency when the 
stimuli to be judged consisted of T-scores above 50 on each scale.
As indicated in Table 2, all coefficients were significant beyond the 
.001 level. Since the judges showed high agreement, it was not neces­
sary to dichotomize the data into groups as had been previously done. 
Thus, with respect to judgments concerning the degree of pathology 
evidenced by T-scores above 50, judges were capable of agreeing sig­
nificantly among themselves.
Judged Importance
When asked to make judgments concerning the importance of the 
MMPI scales in providing information concerning pathology, judges showed 
moderate overall agreement which was statistically significant at less 
than the .001 level, as seen in Table 3. Since the agreement was moder­
ate, the coefficient of concordance was computed for the Minnesota and
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TABLE 2
Group Values for the Coefficient of Concordance, x2 > df, 1?, and 
Average Spearman Rank Correlation for Judgments of Stimuli 
Above the T-score of 50 for Each Basic Scale
Basic Scale W x2 df P —Sav
Hs-1 , .938 330.18 11 <.001 .936
D-2 .952 335.10 11 <.001 .951
Hy-3 .935 329.12 11 <.001 .933
Pd-4 .934 328.68 11 <.001 .932
Mf-5 .925 325.60 11 <.001 .923
Pa-6 .906 318.91 11 <.001 .903
Pt-7 .939 330.53 11 <.001 .937
Sc-8 .878 309.06 11 <.001 .874
Ma-9 .944 332.29 11 <.001 .943
Si-0 .938 270.14 9 <.001 .936
TABLE 3
Group Values for the Coefficient of Concordance, x2 > df, ]?, and 
Average Spearman Rank Correlation for Judgments Concerning 
the Importance of the MMPI Basic Scales
Group W X 2 df P r—Sav
Combined .477 137.26 9 <•001 .460
Minnesota .485 61.14 9 <.001 .445
Kansas .495 80.24 9 <•001 .465
Kansas groups. Again, significant but moderate agreement was obtained 
for both groups; however, the rank order of importance of the scales
differed between groups. Overall, the rank order of importance of the 
basic scales from most to least important was: Sc-8, D-2, Pa-6, Pt-7, 
Ha-9, Pd-4, Hy-3, Hs-1, Si-0, and Mf-5. The rank order on which the 
Minnesota group displayed moderate interjudge agreement was: Sc-8,
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D-2, Pt-7, Ma-9, Pa-6, Hy-3, Pd-4, Hs-1, Mf-5, and Si-0. The Kansas 
group viewed the order of importance of the scales in a somewhat dif­
ferent manner, with Sc-8 being the most important, followed by D-2, 
Pa-6, Pt-7, Pd-4, Ma-9, Hy-3, Hs-1, Si-0, and Mf-5. Thus, while both 
groups viewed Sc-8 and D-2 as the most important scales in providing
information about pathology, the rank order of the scales was somewhat
!
different. This discrepancy will be further discussed in conjunction 
with the scale values of each basic scale.
T-Scores Equated For Pathology
When asked to give T-scores for each scale that reflected the 
same degree of pathology as the standard scale, judges were able to 
agree at least statistically among themselves; however, the level of 
agreement is quite low, as seen in Table 4. An a posteriori dichotomy 
into Minnesota and Kansas groups yielded similar results.
TABLE 4
Group Vjalues for the Coefficient of Concordance, _̂2, d_f, P_, and 
Average Spearman Rank Correlation for Judgments Equating 
T-Scores for Level of Pathology
Group W x2 df P -Sav
Combined .150 43.29 9 <.001 .123
Minnesota .175 22.01 9 <.01 .112
Kansas .156 25.26 9 <.01 .106
In summary, judges show high agreement when asked to indicate 
the degree of pathology indicated by a T-score above 50 for each basic 
MMPI scale. Agreement for T-scores below 50 is seen to be much less,
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and on four scales no significant overall agreement could be achieved.
A moderate level of interjudge agreement resulted when judging the
importance of the basic scales as indicators of pathology, with the
rank order of importance differing between the Minnesota and Kansas
groups. Low, but statistically significant, agreement was seen when
judges attempted to equate pathology across the basic scales. The
<
observed reliability of judges permits a meaningful analysis of the 
importance of the scales and the data consisting of T-scores above 50 
for each scale, but the remaining data must surely be tempered by the 
low interjudge reliability found. Thus, judgmental reliability must 
be taken into account when computing scale values and describing the 
relationship between clinical judgment and the MMPI.
Scale Values
The scale values for degree of pathology and importance of the 
MMPI scales were the geometric means of the magnitude estimations made 
by the judges. Subjective scale values and the slope of the best fit 
line describing the relationship between the psychological scale and 
the stimulus metric were obtained by means of a modified computer pro­
gram (Langhorne and Stone, 1970). The results obtained with this pro­
gram were compared with values computed separately for several scales. 
Both methods yielded identical results. The magnitude scales (degree 
of pathology) were then plotted against their respective stimulus met­
ric (T-scores).
T Scores Below 50
Figures 1 through 10 depict the scale values for the Minnesota 
group and the Kansas group for their magnitude estimations of degree
40
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of pathology for stimuli consisting of T-scores below 50 on each MMPI 
scale. Table 5 presents the power function exponents of the best fit­
ting lines together with the correlation of the stimulus metric and 
the scale values for each basic scale, Five of these correlations 
achieved statistical significance. Inspection of the direction of the
TABLE 5
Power Function Exponents and Correlations of T-Scores Below 
50 With Subjective Scale Values for Each Basic Scale
Scale
———------
Exponent r df P
Hs-1 -.046 -.176 2 NS
D-2 -.667 -.843 2 NS
Hy-3 -.658 -.945 2 NS
Pd-4 -.521 -.921 2 NS
Mf-5 -1.004 -.991 2 <.02
Pa-6 -.993 -.969 2 <.05
Pt-7 -2.039 -.978 2 <.05
Sc-8 -.087 -.606 2 NS
Ma-9 -1.425 -.981 2 <.02
Si-0 -1.121 -.966 2 <.05
correlations reveals that the lower scale values seem to be regarded 
overall as representing increasing pathology, as evidenced by the nega­
tive correlation. Two factors must be considered, however. First, 
interjudge reliability is low, but statistically significant, on four 
of these scales (Mf-5, Pa-6, Ma-9, Si-0), while no significant judg­
mental agreement was present on the Pt-7 scale. In view of the low 
judgmental reliability, then, the scale values and descriptive func­
tions suggested must be scrutinized with caution. Secondly, a pos­
teriori dichotomy of groups reveals that the Minnesota group seems
to regard the lower T-scores as representing less pathology than the
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Kansas group, and less pathology than the standard employed in the study 
(T-score 60). As shown in Table 6, average scale values for the Minne­
sota and Kansas groups differ significantly on 7 of the 10 scales, and 
two of the nonsignificant means are in the same direction. One excep­
tion appears on the Ma-9 scale, where the Minnesota group perceives more
TABLE 6
Group Differences in Grand Means of Perceived .Pathology for 
Judgments on T-Scores Below 50 for Each Basic Scale
Minnesota Kansas
Geometric Geometric
Scale Mean Mean Jt df P
Hs-1 12.54 19.14 4.19 30 <.001
D-2 9.40 24.83 6.38 30 <.001
Hy-3 10.69 21.49 5.34 30 <.001
Pd-4 15.40 22.96 5.02 30 <.001
Mf-5 19.78 29.40 2.44 30 <•05
Pa-6 24.74 28.39 1.04 30 NS
Pt-7 22.28 30.21 1.27 30 NS
Sc-8 13.95 20.59 7.05 30 <.001
Ma-9 36.10 29.35 1.09 30 NS
Si-0 12.44 25.06 3.69 30 <.001
pathology than the Kansas group, and both groups perceive more pathol-
ogy thanl  the standard. However, this group difference is not statis-
tically significant. No' significant difference was found when compar-
ing the average individual slopes for judgments on each scale, as the
largest t value of 1.80 was on the Mf-5 scale when a value of 2.04 was
necessary for significance at the .05 level.
Thus, the Minnesota group generally perceives lower T-scores 
as representing less pathology than the standard, while the Kansas
61
group perceives lower scores as similar to, or more pathological than the 
standard (T-score of 60) employed in this study.
T-Scores Above 50
Figures 11A to 20A graphically depict the scale values obtained 
for each basic scale. The transform of these functions to log-log 
coordinates is depicted in figures 11B to 20B. As may be seen in Table 
7, the correlation between the stimulus value (T-scores) and the scale 
values (geometric means) is highly statistically significant. Thus 
there appears to be a high relationship between these two measures.
TABLE 7
Power Function Exponents and Correlation of T-Scores Above 50 With 
Subjective Scale Values for Each Basic Scale
Scale Exponent r df P
Hs-1 2.535 .988 10 <.001
D-2 2.707 .988 10 <•001
Hy-3 2.561 .988 10 <.001
Pd-4 2.710 .992 10 <.001
Mf-5 2.518 .992 10 <.001
Pa-6 2.875 .980 10 <.001
Pt-7 2.609 .989 10 <.001
Sc-8 2.655 .985 10 <.001
Ma-9 2.661 .985 10 <.001
Si-0 2.879 .992 8 <.001
When degree of pathology was plotted against T-scores, a 
noticeable curvilinear relationship was observed. These two sets of 
data were then plotted using log-log coordinates; the result was a 
linear rectification of the previously observed relationship (figures 
16 to 20B). Thus, a power function approximates the relationship
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between perceived degree of pathology and T-scores for each basic scale. 
The exponents of the best fitting power function for each basic scale 
are reported in Table 7. In general, since the obtained exponents were 
greater than unity, the results may be interpreted to mean that a doubl­
ing of the T-score value results is more than a doubling of the perceived 
pathology. The psychophysical relation between the psychological scale 
(degree of pathology) and the physical scale (T-scores) is rather similar 
for all basic scales as evidenced by the close agreement of the obtained 
exponents.
Examination of the scale values for each scale suggested that 
some T-scores appeared to be grouped together and were somewhat sepa­
rated from other scaled T-scores for that scale. A unidimensional 
cluster analysis (Stone, 1969b) was computed for the subjective judg­
ment of pathology for each scale. The Eisler-Ekman model for estimat­
ing subjective similarity between stimuli and for clustering stimuli 
was employed (cf., Eisler & Ekman, 1959). This methodological proce­
dure is advantageous in that it removes a large portion of subjective 
decision making from the clustering process. The results of the anal­
ysis for each scale are presented in Table 8. Graphically, the average 
perceived degree of pathology for each cluster is depicted for each 
scale in figures 11A to 20A. On all scales the T-scores 55 to 65, 
scaled with respect to degree of pathology indicated, form the lowest 
cluster. A second cluster on all scales, with the exception of Si-0, 
includes the T-scores in the range of 70 to 80. For five scales (D-2, 
Pd-4, Mf-5, Pa-6, and Ma-9) the T-scores of 80 or 85 to 110 form one 
cluster. For three scales (Sc-8, Pt-7, Hy-3) the final cluster is
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TABLE 8
Cluster Analysis and Average Cluster Perceived Pathology of 










Hs-1 . 100-110 104.73 Pa-6 80-110 104.51
80-95 73.56 70-75 51.88
70-75 44.77 55-65 24.59
55-65 24.70
D-2 80-110 95.01 Pt-7 90-110 99.88
70-75 45.96 75-85 62.39
55-65 24.97 70 39.53
55-65 25.03
Hy-3 90-110 104.50 Sc-8 90-110 104.69
80-85 68.37 75-85 67.31
70-75 48.06 70 41.24
55-65 26.64 55-65 25.52
Pd-4 80-110 94.32 Ma-9 85-110 98.17
70-75 46.27 70-80 49.51
55-65 25.02 55-65 25.14
Mf-5 80-110 94.32 Si-0 70-100 73.24
70-75 40.28 55-65 24.74
55-65 25.16
formed with T-scores from 90 to 100. On the Si-0 scale, where two 
clusters were obtained, the second cluster includes T-scores from 70 
to 100. For the Hs-1 scale, the final cluster is the least inclusive; 
comprised of T-scores from 100 to 110. Thus, with one exception, the 
clustering procedure reveals that the T-scores from 90 - 100 are not 
overly dissimilar with respect to degree of pathology indicated as
seen by the judges.
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Judged Importance
The scale values obtained when judges were asked to make mag­
nitude estimations of the degree of importance of each of the basic 
scales indicates that the Sc-8 scale is seen as the most important 
scale. The magnitude estimation ratio scale had a range of 3.733 
(Sc-8) to 1.000 (Mf-5) between the "most" and "least" important basic 
scale in providing information pertinent to pathology. The obtained 
geometric means and transformed ratio scale values for each scale are 
presented in Table 9.
TABLE 9
Scale Values, Medians, Q^, and for Judgments Concerning the 
Importance of the Basic MMPI Scales
Scale Scale Value
Transformed 
Ratio Scale Median Si S 3
Sc-8 99.829 3.733 100.00 72.46 111.80
D-2 80.84 3.023 72.46 52.44 100.00
Pa-6 61.93 2.316 64.81 50.00 87.46
Pt-7 59.96 2.243 52.44 50.00 92.47
Hy-3 51.37 1.921 50.00 42.43 54.77
Ma-9 50.89 1.903 50.00 42.43 60.00
Pd-4* 50.00 1.870 50.00 50.00 50.00
Hs-1 47.58 1.779 47.43 10.00 58.99
Si-0 28.31 1.059 30.00 20.00 47.43
Mf-5 26.74 1.000 27.39 20.00 44.72
*Pd-4 was the standard stimulus employed, with an assigned modulus of .
A .unidimensional cluster analysis was again computed based on
the scaled subjective information of degree of importance of the
scales. Three clusters resulted from this procedure The first
cluster consisted of the two most important scales, Sc-8 and D-2. The
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second cluster consisted of scales which had intermediate perceived impor­
tance, Pa-6, Pt-7, Hy-3, Ma-9, Pd-4, Hs-1. The final cluster consisted 
of the two least important scales, Mf-5 and Si-0.
In reference to the difference in agreement of the ranked impor­
tance noted between the Minnesota group and the Kansas group, it should 
be mentioned that discrepancies in order occurred only within stimulus 
clusters, and the clusters remained the same for both groups. As Stone 
(1969b) pointed out, if the reliability concerning the scale value of 
any particular stimulus is important, one should consider the ratio 
scale value of the cluster rather than the individual stimulus.
Thus, from the subjective judgments of importance of the basic 
scales, three clusters represent the ten scales in terms of their 
believed importance in providing information pertinent to pathology.
T-Scores Equated for Pathology
Judges were asked to state the T-score for each scale which 
represented the same degree of pathology (50) across all scales. A 
comparison was made between the judged T-score indicating the degree 
of pathology of 50, and the estimated T-score indicating the same 
degree of pathology for each scale. The estimated T-score was obtained 
by interpolation from the line of best fit since judges had previously 
scaled the degree of pathology for each basic scale. The results of 
this comparison are presented in Table 10. With the exception of the 
Mf-5 scale, judges' direct estimations of a T-score value reflecting 
the degree of pathology of 50 were lower than the interpolated scale 
value obtained from the magnitude estimations of degree of pathology 
for each scale. A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test was
computed for these data. The results indicate that the observed differ­
ences were well beyond what one would expect on the basis of chance, 
alone (T = 1> P. <.01). Such statistical value indicates that the judged 




Differences Between Judged and Interpolated T-Scores Reflecting 





T-Score Obtained by 
Direct Estimation
Difference of Judged 
from Interpolated
Hs-1 77.07 72.04 -5.03
D-2 75.63 71.49 -4.14
Hy-3 74.87 71.70 -3.17
Pd-4* 75.82 70.00 -5.82
Mf-5 77.89 78.11 .22
Pa-6 74.06 67.64 -6.42
Pt-7 76.26 74.33 -1.93
Sc-8 75.01 68.74 -6.27
Ma-9 76.17 74.18 -1.99
Si-0 75.58 74.84 - .74
*A Pd-4 T-score of 70 was the standard used
Goodness of Fit
Two commonly employed methods to determine how well the line of 
best fit describes the observed relationship were not applicable in the 
present situation. First, the degree of pathology was calculated as 
geometric means rather than as arithmetic means; and secondly, the judg­
ments made in this investigation were not independent of each other 
since each judge made judgments with respect to all T-scores for each 
scale. Thus, product moment correlations were computed between the
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obtained magnitude estimation scale value and the predicted magnitude 
scale values for each scale.
In view of the disparate results obtained when examining the 
Minnesota and Kansas groups for judgments pertaining to stimuli below 
a T-score of 50 for each scale and the low interjudge agreement evi­
denced on this task, a determination on the adequacy of the best fit 
line was not attempted.
However, a determination of the quality of fit for judgments 
obtained when the stimuli used were above the T-score of 50 was made. 
The correlations between the logarithms of the obtained and predicted 
scale values are presented in Table 11. It can be seen that the line 
of best fit previously described does indeed adequately depict the 
relationship observed.
TABLE 11
Correlation Between Log of Obtained and Predicted Scale Values 
for T-Scores Above 50 on Each Basic Scale
Scale r df P
Hs-1 .989 10 <.001
D-2 .988 10 <. 001
Hy-3 .988 10 <. 001
Pd-4 .992 10 <. 001
Mf-5 .988 10 <. 001
Pa-6 .980 10 <. 001
Pt-7 .989 10 <.001
Sc-8 .985 10 <.001
Ma-9 .985 10 <. 001
Si-0 .992 8 <. 001
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Judgmental Variability
On prothetic continua, subjective variability tends to grow as 
a linear function of subjective magnitude. This relationship between 
judgmental variability and psychological magnitude has been labeled by 
Stevens (1966a) as Ekman's law. To test this proposition in the present 
study, product moment correlations were computed between a measure of 
subjective variability (quartile deviations of magnitude estimations) 
and subjective scale values (geometric means) for each basic scale.
These correlations seen in Table 12, indicate that judgmental varia­
bility increases as judgments are made with respect to the degree of 
pathology associated with T-scores on MMPI scales. Thus, stimuli 
(T-scores) reflecting higher degrees of pathology were associated 
with more judgmental variability than were stimuli reflecting lower 
degrees of pathology.
TABLE 12
Product Moment Correlations Between Quartile Deviations of Magnitude 
Estimates and Subjective Scale Values of T-Scores Above 50 for Each
Basic Scale
Scale r df P
Hs-1 .967 10 <.001
D-2 1 .896 10 <.001
Hy-3 .911 10 <.001
Pd-4 .968 10 <.001
Mf-5 .905 10 <.001
Pa-6 .961 10 <.001
Pt-7 .915 10 <•001
Sc-8 .951 10 <.001
Ma-9 .800 10 <.01
Si-0 .959 8 <.001
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This finding is in complete agreement with Ekman's law (Stevens, 1966a), 
that variability in subjective units tends to grow as a linear function 
of subjective magnitude.
Validity ThreshoIds
Psychophysics has traditionally meant a science of the inter­
relations of the psychical and the physical. However, these methods 
have been used to demonstrate relationships betx^een psychological judg­
ment and some other nonphysical dimension (Stone, 1968a). In an effort 
to extend the classical psychophysical analogy to the present data, a 
determination of thresholds for the validity scales on the MMPI was 
made. The psychological continuum was determined using the calculated 
proportions for judgments of "nonvalidity" associated with each of the • 
stimuli (raw scores or T-scores) based on judgments obtained using the 
method of constant stimuli. Absolute threshold limens were computed 
following the linear interpolation process (Guilford, 1954), with the 
quartiles Qj_ and Q-j computed as additional information. This procedure 
removes most of the objections to the linear interpolation process that 
not all the data are used in finding the threshold and that no estimate 
of dispersion is made.
On the ? scale, the absolute threshold was found to be 64.25. 
That' is, when more than 64 questions are unanswered on the MMPI, the 
resulting profile is not likely to be judged as valid for interpreta­
tion. The Qjl value was 44.48 and was found to be 83.45, with the 
standard deviation of 27.44. Since no "doubtful" category was permitted 
the judges, the classical methods employed to determine the interval of 
uncertainty could not be utilized. However, the interval of uncertainty
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may be seen to stand in relation to the and values obtained. A 
standard error of the median of 6.09 was computed; thus, the "true" 
threshold could be expected to lie within the range, 52.35 to 76.15,
95 percent of the time. With respect to the T-score distribution pro­
vided on the MMPI profile sheet, the absolute threshold above which the 
overall profile may be regarded as nonvalid lies between the T-scores 
of 56 and 63.
For the L scale, was found to be 9.32, and the value was 
11.62, with a standard deviation of 1.71. The absolute threshold limen 
which resulted was 10.49. With a standard error of the median of .38, 
the "true" value for this threshold would be expected to occur within 
the range, 9.75 to 11.23, 95 percent of the time. Mien converted to 
T-scores, this range, above which the overall profile may be regarded 
as nonvalid lies between the T-scores of 68 to 74. Thus, when approxi­
mately ten questions are answered incorrectly on the L scale, the 
resulting profile is not likely to be regarded as valid for accurate 
interpretation.
It was impossible to determine a threshold or point of non­
validity for the F scale, since only 37.5 percent of the judges regarded 
a T-score of 80 as constituting a nonvalid profile. Since the stimuli 
judged ranged from T-scores of 30 to 80, the limen could not be assessed 
Apparently, there is no consensus on what F scale T-score constitutes a 
nonvalid profile. A majority of clinicians in this study regarded the 
overall profile valid for interpretation, even with a T-score of 80 
obtained on this scale.
A ^  value of 71.82 and a value of 79.50 were obtained for 
the K scale, with a standard deviation of 5.69. The resulting absolute
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absolute threshold of validity \<ras a T-score of 75.58 with a standard 
error of 1.26. Then, 95 percent of the time the "true" threshold would 
lie between T-scores of 73.11 to 78.05. Thus, when a T-score of approx 
imately 76 is seen on the K scale, the resulting profile would not be 
likely to be considered valid for interpretation. It is interesting to 
note, however, that 20 percent of the judges in this study did not 




The goal of the present investigation was to describe the rela­
tionship between clinical judgment and the MMPI basic and validity 
scales. Three areas of judgment were focused upon: the perceived 
degree of pathology evidenced by T-scores on each basic scale, the sub­
jective importance of each basic scale in providing information perti­
nent to pathology, and the score (in raw or in T-score form) for each 
validity scale which resulted in the overall profile being judged as 
not valid for interpretation.
In general, results in the first area indicate that judges were 
unable to agree on the degree of pathology associated with T-scores 
below 50 for each scale. Judges from Minnesota tended to view lower 
T-scores as less pathological than judges from Kansas. Hox^ever, for 
T-scores above 50 on each basic scale, judges displayed high concor­
dance in their subjective impression of pathology. Perceived pathology 
was observed to increase in a curvilinear manner when plotted against 
the appropriate stimulus metric for each basic scale. With respect to 
the second area, moderate agreement resulted when judges estimated sub­
jective importance of the MMPI scales. Finally, judgmental thresholds 




In assessing judgmental reliability, the Kendall coefficient of 
concordance was used. This nonparametric statistic was one method 
available for these data to determine interjudge agreement among several 
stimuli. However, in the present context this statistic is somewhat 
inappropriate for several reasons. First, an ordinal level of measure­
ment is assumed for the coefficient, and it is rank order agreement 
which is expressed by a significant value of W. With data obtained 
from magnitude estimations, a ratio level of measurement is assumed 
to result. Consequently, much information is lost when magnitude esti­
mations are converted to ranks. Secondly, the rationale for W states 
that the degree of agreement among judges is reflected by the degree 
of variance among the sums of ranks for the stimuli judged. Thus, when 
no agreement exists among judges, the sum of the rankings for stimuli 
would be equal. However, in the present case, the sum of rankings for 
some stimuli would be expected to be more nearly equal, since a power 
function best fits the data. This would result in lower values of W 
which would not necessarily accurately reflect interjudge agreement. 
These considerations make it seem quite probable that the interjudge 
agreement reflected by the coefficient of concordance represents an 
underestimate of the actual judgmental reliability.
Another factor influencing the obtained judgmental agreement 
is that judges were instructed that the magnitude estimations were not 
to be considered a test of the reliability or accuracy of clinical 
judgment; and as such, they were not to be concerned about the con­
sistency of their judgments. This factor may also contribute to an
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underestimate of interjudge agreement, and one must be cognizant of this 
fact when interpreting the results of the present study.
As indicated in Table 1, when making judgments concerning the 
degree of pathology reflected by T-scores below 50, overall interjudge 
agreement was low, but statistically significant on only five of the 
basic scales. However, this apparent concordance is somewhat mislead­
ing when one examines the data with respect to the Minnesota and Kansas 
groupings. On only two of the scales (Pa-6 and Ma-9) do both groups 
show inter- as well as intra-group agreement. For the remaining eight 
scales, the judges do not show significant inter-group agreement. It 
seems, then, that the judges do not agree on the degree of pathology 
reflected by T-scores below 50. In contrast, highly significant judg­
mental reliability was evident when judging the perceived pathology of 
T-scores above 50 for each basic scale. Perhaps one reason which may 
account for this disagreement is the relative infrequency with which 
low scores are actually encountered. It is typically more common to 
observe elevated scores on a scale than the low scores which are 
employed as stimuli in the present study. Hence, less familiarity 
with the stimuli may yield greater disagreement among judges.
A second, and perhaps overriding, consideration appears when 
one examines the interpretive statements given for low scores.
Research conducted by Hathaway and Meehl and by Gough at the Institute 
of Personality Assessment and Research suggests generally that low 
scores on the MMPI basic scales are perceived as indicative of adjust­
ment. This research was conducted in the late 1950's and has been sum­
marized in interpretive manuals by Dahlstrom and Welsh (1960) and by
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Carson (1960). However, one is typically cautioned when interpreting low 
scores that "very little" is known about these scores and their meaning.
In fact, there is a notable paucity of recent articles devoted to the 
interpretation of low scores on the basic scales. A fairly exhaustive 
survey of the literature revealed few articles concerning this topic. It 
appears that since low scores had been previously regarded as indicating 
adjustment, very little subsequent research has been devoted to this area. 
In spite of the general consensus among interpretive manuals, no such 
agreement was evident among judges in this study. It would seem that 
more research is needed concerning the meaning of low T~scores on the 
basic scales.
With respect to the judged importance of the basic scales in pro­
viding information pertinent to pathology, moderate interjudge agreement 
was achieved. Thus, with the exception of judgments concerning T-scores 
below 50, significant interjudge concordance was attained in the present 
study. Judgmental reliability is a necessary prerequisite to any psy­
chological scaling effort, and it is the foundation of all acceptable 
scaling methodologies. As Underwood (1957) notes, "If our response mea­
sure is not reliable, no further investigation should be undertaken. 
Science attempts to discover and understand reproducible phenomena; lack 
of reliability in our attempts at measurement precludes this reproduc­
ibility" (p. 22). Since substantial judgmental reliability was observed 
in the present study, further analysis of the data appeared justifiable.
T-Scores Below 50
As previously mentioned, judges were unable to agree on the 
degree of pathology indicated by T-scores below 50 on each basic scale.
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In an effort to account for this disagreement, a posteriori analyses were 
conducted, utilizing the available information on the judges. No differ­
ences between judges were found with regard to their number of years 
experience with the MMPI or the percentage of patients to whom they 
administered the MMPI. In fact, the judges were remarkably similar in 
these respects. For example, the judge who reported that he presently 
administered the MMPI to 15 percent of his patients indicated that this 
figure was not totally accurate since he was currently in private prac­
tice, and had administered the MMPI to a much larger percentage of 
patients previously.
When the data was dichotomized into geographic areas of employ­
ment, significant differences were noted between judges. This means of 
analysis proved valuable in accounting for much of the obtained inter­
judge variance. In general, judges from Minnesota perceive less pathol­
ogy In low scores than do judges from Kansas. As summarized in Table 6, 
these differences were statistically significant on seven of the basic 
scales. On only one scale, Ma-9, did the Minnesota group view the lower 
scores as indicating more pathology than the standard employed. For 
this scale they were not significantly different from the Kansas group. 
The Minnesota group, then, tends to view pathology as linear for each 
basic scale; that is, low scores indicate less pathology than high 
T-scores. The Kansas group perceived pathology in a nonlinear manner, 
with low scores generally seen as indicating an increasing degree of 
pathology, although still less than the pathology indicated for high 
T-scores.
These differences in perceived pathology are suggestive of two 
things. First, there is some discrepancy between the manual and actual
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practice when interpreting MMPI profiles. The Minnesota group seems to 
follow the manual more consistently when interpreting low scores. The 
Kansas group of judges does not concur with the manual in their per­
ceived pathology of low scores. It should be emphasized that the judges 
employed in the present study could be considered qualified experts in 
the use of the MMPI. They rely on the MMPI both as a diagnostic tool 
and as an index of personality dynamics. Thus, the obtained interjudge 
disagreement assumes more significance, and together with the previ­
ously noted scarcity of literature devoted to low MMPI scores, strongly 
suggests that more research is needed to clarify the discrepancies 
observed in this study.
Secondly, the obtained group differences are suggestive of dif­
fering approaches concerning pathology. The judgments of both groups 
may be seen to be representative of the deviant-response tendency (Berg, 
1961). This tendency concerns individual differences in making uncommon 
responses. For example, if 80 percent of the people agree with a state­
ment, anyone who disagrees with that statement is said to give a deviant 
response. Berg (1961) hypothesized that the deviant-response tendency 
is very general across many different types of instruments and that it 
is an important dimension of personality. Nunnally (1967) suggests, 
however, that it is more parsimonious to interpret such responses in 
terms of the traits which the instrument is intended to measure. The 
MMPI scales have for the most part been developed by comparing the 
responses of normal people with patients in mental hospitals. As 
expected, the responses of hospitalized patients are deviant on the 
average with respect to the average responses of normal people. How­
ever, a problem with the construct of deviant-response arises since
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merely stating that a person is deviant on the average in his responses 
does not reflect whether he is deviantly well adjusted rather than mal­
adjusted. It is the interpretation of these deviant responses on the 
MMPI which differs between the Minnesota and Kansas groups. The Kansas 
group perceives both high and low deviant responses as indicative of 
maladjustment. On the other hand, the Minnesota group perceives only 
high scores as suggesting maladjustment, while low scores in general 
are interpreted as indicating the more positive aspects of adjustment. 
Thus, the Kansas groups’ judgments may be interpreted as reflecting 
normality as a statistical concept (Buss, 1966). That is, those tend­
encies most frequently occurring in the population constitute "normal­
ity." The derived or standard score T distribution is suited to this 
interpretation since the most frequently occurring scores are distrib­
uted close to the mean of 50 (normality?), with the less frequently 
occurring scores seen as deviations from this mean (abnormality?).
The results of the Minnesota judgments are suggestive of normality 
defined as a continuous concept of the absence of mental illness.
Thus, low T-scores are generally indicative of the more positive 
aspects of adjustment. The statistical T distribution does not suit­
ably reflect the continuity of the Minnesota concept of pathology.
In this sense then, the T distribution may be a somewhat misleading 
statistic for use in the interpretation and scoring of the MMPI since 
the T distribution implies an underlying normal distribution, whereas, 
pathology or maladjustment is perceived as negatively skewed by the 
Minnesota group.
The obtained intra- and inter-group agreement was not suffi­
ciently high to permit definitive statements to be made concerning
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the degree of pathology reflected by low T-scores. However, the a pos­
teriori groupings of judges was beneficial in suggesting areas of dis­
crepancy in interpretation.
T-Scores Above 50
High judgmental reliability was found when stimuli consisted of 
T-scores above 50 for each basic scale. When judged degree of pathology 
was plotted against the stimulus metric (T-scores), a curvilinear rela­
tionship was observed for each basic scale. A rectification of this 
curvilinearity resulted when these two sets of values were plotted on 
log-log coordinates. Thus, a power function described the relationship 
between judged degree of pathology and T-scores above 50 on each scale. 
As indicated in Table 11, the power function fit for each scale provided 
a rather good description of the data. Since the exponents are greater 
than unity, this may be interpreted to mean that a doubling of the sti­
mulus metric results in more than a doubling on the. related psycholog­
ical scale. For example, on the Hs-1 scale, an increase of ten (65 . 
to 75) on the T-score distribution results in an increase of approxi­
mately twenty-five in the perceived degree of pathology. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that psychologists would have acquired some 
"input" information concerning the degree of pathology from clinical 
experience, formal training, or familiarity with research findings. If 
the stimulus metric employed in the present study is at all representa­
tive of such "input," then the psychophysical lav? suggested by Stevens 
(1957) may be appropriate to consider when studying the mechanisms and 
phenomena of clinical judgment. As Stone (1969b) suggests, the direct
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estimation methodology of psychophysics ifray indeed be appropriate when 
considering clinical material as stimuli.
The results of the unidimensional cluster analysis of T-scores 
above 50 scaled according to their judged degree of pathology indicate 
that certain T-score values are not seen as being significantly differ­
ent from each other. A notable example of this can be seen on the Si-0 
scale where two clusters represent the T-score range of 55 to 100. Of 
particular interest is the finding that on all scales, T-scores of 55 
to 65 are included in the first cluster, while the T-score of 70 
occurred in the second cluster. The results of the cluster analysis 
for T-scores above 70 are more variable, and there is no clear demar­
cation present as was observed between 65 and 70. Thus, there appears 
to be operating an effect similar to the boundary effect reported by 
Sinnett and Stone (1965) and Stone and Sinnett (1968). In the former 
study, Sinnett and Stone employed stimuli consisting of equal ten point 
intervals of intelligence. When presented with two equal intervals for 
comparison, one of which crossed a boundary (e.g., from Retarded to 
Dull Normal) and one which did not, the one which crossed the boundary 
was judged to be phenomenally larger. Stone and Sinnett (1968) simi­
larly found that intervals which contained a grade boundary (e.g.,
C+ to B- contains the category boundary, B) were invariably judged as 
being greater than adjacent intervals (C to C+ and B to B+). In the 
present study this effect could be expected since a T-score of 70, 
representing two standard deviations from the mean, has typically been 
regarded as a critical value for interpretation. Correspondingly, 
less emphasis has been devoted to higher T-score values.
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In general, three clusters are seen to represent the T-score 
range above 50. The cluster judged to indicate the highest degree of 
pathology consists of T-scores from 85 to 100. A second "category" 
of pathology includes T-scores of 70 to 80. The third "category" of 
T-scores from 55 to 65 represents the lowest degree of perceived 
pathology. It may be noted that these clusters tend to include a 
greater number of stimuli with increasing T-score values. It appears 
that this phenomena may be an example of unequal discriminability with 
increasing stimulus magnitude mentioned by Stevens (1957). These sub­
jective groupings differ from the grouping of T-scores suggested by 
formal training with the MMPI. Formal training defines a high eleva­
tion on a scale to be T-scores above 70. A moderate elevation is 
defined by the T-score range of 60 to 70. The low elevation on a 
scale includes all scores below 50. Thus, subjectively delineated 
elevations divide the range of T-scores above 70 into two "categories," 
where formal training does not make this distinction. Perhaps future 
research projects should incorporate these subjective groupings into 
their designs. When used as criteria, qualitative differences between 
patients scoring in each group may be discerned; where as previously, 
some variability in describing patients was evident. Again, it seems 
as if the equal interval T distribution may be somewhat misleading when 
interpreting the MMPI.
When judges were asked to give a T-score for each basic scale 
that reflected the same degree of pathology as the standard (Pd-4 
T-score of 70), they were unable to do so with a high degree of inter­
judge agreement. Their judged T-scores were consistently lower than 
the T-scores interpolated from the line of best fit for each scale.
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Apparently, this task was difficult for the judges to perforin. One might 
have expected that the judged T-scores would bear some relation to the 
judged importance of each scale. For example, a lower T~score on a more 
important scale may indicate the same degree of pathology as a higher 
T-score on a less important scale. However, no consistent patterns were 
evident in the judged scores. These results suggest that future inves­
tigations should devote their efforts to examining judged inter-scale 
relationships. These relationships seem to be the foundation of the 
clinician's configural analysis of MMPI profiles. Such interjudge dis­
agreement as indicated in this study may contribute to the low validity 
and reliability rates of clinicians as reported by Goldberg (1968).
Judged Importance
As seen in Table 9, the perceived most important scale (Sc-8) 
was judged to be four times as great as the scale judged to be of least 
importance (Mf-5). When a unidimensional cluster analysis was computed 
on the date, three groupings of importance were obtained. In the first 
cluster were the two scales judged to be the most important in providing 
information pertinent to pathology, Sc-8 and D-2. The former may be 
regarded as one of the "psychotic" scales, while the latter is referred 
to as a "neurotic" scale. A further examination of these scales 
reveals their importance. The D-2 scale is the most frequent to peak 
in the profiles of psychiatric patients (Carson, 1969). "In general, 
it is the best single- and remarkably efficient- index of immediate 
satisfaction, comfort, and security; it tells something of how the 
individual evaluates himself and his role in the world" (p. 285).
The Sc-8 scale contains items dealing with a wide variety of topics,
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including social alienation, bizarre feelings, disorganized thought and 
inadequate social relationships. It was developed on schizophrenic 
individuals, and is extremely valuable in the diagnosis of schizo­
phrenia. Thus, perhaps there appears to be sufficient validity to the 
judgments of clinicians concerning the importance of these two scales.
The same three clusters were obtained for both Minnesota and 
Kansas judges; however, differences in the order of some scales were 
noted within two clusters. The stability of psychological scale values 
depends on a number of conditions. One of prime importance is the num­
ber of judges involved. When examining group differences in the present 
study, the number of judges in each group was relatively small. Thus, 
any particular scale value might be expected to fluctuate. In such 
instances Stone (1969b) suggests that the cluster value should be con­
sidered as the scale score. Thus, the discrepancies obtained within a 
cluster in this study is not unexpected, and does not negate the over­
all results.
When making magnitude estimations of importance (of basic 
scales), judges were instructed to make them in relation to the hypo­
thetical patient described. However, many judges reported that their 
judgments applied generally, and were not restricted to the patient 
described. One might expect this generality since frequently the only 
information the clinician is provided with is the name, age and sex of 
the patient with no complete clinical history. It remains for future 
investigations to substantiate the generality of the present judged 
importance of the basic scales. Should the order of importance then 
be validated, it may well be that appropriate weightings could be 
applied to these scales when devising a scoring system for the MMPI.
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A direct comparison of the present results of judged importance 
with Oskamp's (1967) subjective weights for MMP1 scales may not be 
wholly defensible. The judgments were obtained in different situations, 
and Oskamp used a criterion with which to relate the judgments different 
from the present scaled dimension. However, an informal scrutiny of the 
proportional loadings attached to each scale reveals that in both 
instances the Sc-8 scale was selected as having the most influence in 
reaching a decision. Oskamp reported discrepancies between the objec­
tively determined influence of each scald and the subjectively reported 
influence. Judges apparently underestimated the importance of the 
scales. Oskamp employed a new method when investigating the process 
of clinical judgment using a multiple regression procedure suggested 
by Hoffman (1960). In this manner he was able to compute the relation­
ship of each predictor variable (MMPI scales) to the decision of each 
judge.
The present study suggests that the direct estimation proce­
dure may also be a promising new method for investigating the process 
of clinical judgment. This procedure affords the judge more latitude 
when assigning subjective weights, and may prove to be a more benefi­
cial means of securing these subjective responses. Certainly future 
research is necessary, but from preliminary indications, there appears 
to be more concordance of subjective weights with the objectively deter­
mined weights when the former are assessed by direct estimation proce­
dures. In addition, a much broader subjective response continuum is 
obtained with these procedures which may facilitate future comparisons. 
Perhaps a combination of the two methods would be helpful, such that
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subjective importance is assessed by direct estimation and validity 
coefficients are determined through multiple regression methodologies.
As Stone (1968a) mentions, "It does seem that the theory and methods 
of psychophysics, especially the newer direct estimation methods asso­
ciated with the psychophysical power law, can be constructively uti­
lized to better explore the judgmental continua involving clinical 
content" (p. 31).
Validity Thresholds
For the three validity scales (?, L, and K), judges were able to 
state a score above which the overall MMPI profile could not be validly 
interpreted. On the fourth validity scale, the F scale, the judges could 
not agree on a threshold, and only 12 of 32 judges were willing to state 
that the highest stimulus value employed (T-score of 80) constituted an 
invalid profile. While a threshold determination was possible for the 
K scale, at the highest stimulus (T-score of 80) 7 of 32 judges still 
reported the profile to be valid for interpretation. Only on the ? and 
L scales, then, did all judges report a score which indicated the pro­
file was not valid.
Judges had a somewhat more difficult time with this task. They 
frequently mentioned that the validity scales depended on their relation 
with other scales, and thus it was difficult to determine a single point 
or score. For example, the F scale and the Sc-8 scale are inter-related, 
and if both were elevated, judges may still regard the profile as valid 
for interpretation. Also, judges offered the explanation that even if 
the validity scales were elevated, this fact alone would indicate some­
thing about the testee, and they would cautiously make inferences from
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the profile. In fact, "unusual" K scores as well as other validity 
scores are considered when evaluating the overall profile. A perusal of 
the interpretative manuals (cf., Carson, 1969) corroborates this view.
On the ? scale, while raw scores approaching 100 may attenuate the 
clinical profile, they also provide additional information concerning 
obsessional processes, extreme intellectualism, and severe psychiatric 
impairment. Raw scores above 5 on the L scale may indicate excessive 
rigidity or an attempt to present a good front. With a T-score of 80 
on the F scale, the examiner is cautioned that he has a nonvalid pro­
file. However, additional interpretation of an elevated F scale score 
include confusion or psychotic processes, distortions due to falsely 
claiming mental symptoms, lack of cooperation, or lack of intellectual 
comprehension. No particular T-score on the K scale is suggested as 
indicating a nonvalid profile, and in fact, high T-scores may indicate 
people who have difficulties in social relations, or who may not have 
their lives well ordered and controlled. Thus, while validity thres­
holds were able to be determined for some scales, even elevated scores 
on the validity scale provide some information about the patient which 
may be interpreted with caution.
This task employed the classical psychophysical method of con­
stant stimuli. As Guilford (1954) points out, the constant methods are 
generally regarded as the most accurate and most widely applicable of 
all psychophysical methods. They are employed with convenience in the 
measurement of stimulus limens, differential thresholds, and equivalent 
stimuli. In fact, Guilford (1954) states that "undoubtedly one of the 
appeals of the constant methods is their versatility and broad range of
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applicability. The relative simplicity of making judgments is attractive 
to observers" (p. 147). However, in the present study, many judges com­
mented that this method made the judgment task more difficult since one 
"point" was difficult to determine. They also felt restricted in their 
responses. No subjective discomfort was reported by judges when making 
magnitude estimations. It seems, then, that perhaps this classical 
method of psychophysics creates more subjective discomfort for judges. 
Thus, the direct estimation procedures suggested by Stevens (1957) may 
be preferable on this point when investigating clinical judgment.
Limitations
The present study represented an exploratory venture, extending 
the psychophysical analogy into a new area of clinical judgment. As an 
initial effort, there are several limitations to be considered when 
examining the results. First, the task presented to the judges pre­
sented a somewhat artificial situation since MMPI scales are not nor­
mally regarded in an individual manner when interpreting the profile. 
Inter-scale comparisons are made by the clinician and the present study 
did not directly attempt to investigate these comparisons. Thus, gen­
eralizations of these results to a "real world" situation must await 
further investigation.
Secondly, some judges objected to the scaled dimension, degree 
of pathology. They objected to the term pathology, and reported that 
they did not ordinarily conceive of the MMPI scores as reflecting the 
degree of pathology. It should be noted, however, that the majority 
of judges offered no objection to the scaled dimension. Some of these 
judges indicated that the task was highly interesting, and it provided
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a means of formulating their own judgments wiich they had not done pre­
viously. Thus, for the vast majority of the judges, it would appear 
that the scaled dimension was appropriate, although future investiga­
tions may wish to consider alternative evaluative dimensions.
There is some evidence to suggest that the standard employed in 
scaling the degree of pathology (T-score of 60) was inappropriate. A 
standard should be selected in the middle range of stimuli so that the 
slopes for stimuli above and below the standard will be similar (cf., 
Poulton, 1968). Objectively, the standard employed represented one 
standard deviation in a mildly pathological direction. However, the 
results of the modified cluster analj'sis indicate that the standard 
was not perceived as mildly pathological for judgments above the 
T-score of 50. T-scores of 55 to 65 were not seen as dissimilar by 
judges, and occurred in the cluster indicating the lowest degree of 
pathology. As Poulton (1968) points out, with a standard selected 
too low in the range of stimuli, steeper slopes result for stimuli 
larger than the standard. It is suggested that future researchers, 
if not involved with T-scores above 50, select a standard from the 
second cluster of each scale, approximately a T-score of 75, which 
would more adequately represent the middle range of stimuli.
The standard for judged importance of the basic scales (Pd-4) 
did seem to be an appropriate middle range standard. For both groups 
of judges, Pd-4 occurred in the middle cluster of the basic scales.
Another difficulty frequently encountered in using magnitude 
estimation methods is idiosyncratic number usage. Judges have had 
previous exposure to parts of the number continuum. However, as
Stevens (1966b) points out, judges may have curious misconceptions about 
the number domain. For example, they may feel that when they use num­
bers below ten, they may run out of numbers to assign to still weaker 
stimuli which are presented for judgment. Judges may be frequently 
unaware that there is an infinite set of numbers below ten. Stevens 
(1966b) has suggested a partial remedy to clarify the judges' conception 
of numbers and their use in making magnitude estimations. This sugges­
tion involves the magnitude number of apparent length; that is, matching 
numbers to lengths of lines. By following this procedure, "many quirks 
and misconceptions about numbers can be rectified before other number 
matching begins" (Stevens, 1966b, p. 397). The present study employed 
this procedure before the judges began the actual task in an effort to 
avoid some of the pitfalls noted by Stevens. In the present study some 
judges used numbers ranging from 1 to 300, while others employed a more 
restricted range of 25 to 75 when making their estimations. The modulus 
assigned to the standard seemed adequate, and was not itself a cause for 
the restriction of range. These differences could be attributable to 
personal perceptions or a number of cultural factors. However, no sig­
nificant difference in slopes was noted between groups of judges, and 
there is no evidence to indicate that idiosyncratic number usage had a 
marked effect on the obtained relationships. While difficult to deter­
mine, it seems as if the assumption inherent in ratio scaling of judges 
using numbers in the same way as psychologists or mathematicians (Ekman 
and Sjoberg, 1965) was not violated.
A final limitation of the present study is noted with respect 
to the Minnesota and Kansas groupings. The Minnesota group contained
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members who did not receive their degrees from the University of Minne­
sota. It may be possible to assume that these psychologists had been 
employed a sufficient length of time in Minnesota, and had participated 
in a sufficient number of case conferences to have acquired the Minne­
sota "bias.” However, this assumption must be empirically substantiated, 
and in the present study, ther-e was no means of evaluating this question. 
The Kansas group was similarly comprised of members who did not receive 
their training at the University of Kansas. And while no member had 
received his degree from Minnesota, some may have attended Minnesota- 
conducted seminars on the MMPI. The author is aware of one Kansas judge 
who had been employed for two years on the University of Minnesota cam­
pus. This particular judge received a large part of his training in the 
MMPI while he was there. In fact, his judgments resembled the Minnesota 
group more than those of his Kansas colleagues. Even with this lack of 
group homogeneity, a significant difference was obtained between groups, 
which suggests that this is a meaningful variable to further investigate. 
Additionally, the number of judges in each group was relatively small. 
Thus, the groups in no way represent a true dichotomy, and considerable 
confounding may be present. The a posteriori decision to form these 
groups, while somewhat arbitrary, did provide an aid toward understand­
ing the results of the data. It is obvious that a purification of these 
groups is needed to explore the trend suggested by this study.
Implications and Extensions
In the present study, direct estimation procedures proved to be 
a valuable tool in investigating clinical judgment on the MMPI. The 
relationships between perceived pathology and MMPI scale scores were
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curvilinear, suggesting that this judgmental continuum was regarded in 
an "intensity" rather than a "positional" manner by the judges (Stone, 
1970). Using Stevens' terminology, perhaps this judgmental continuum 
might best be classified as prothetic or Class I. Previously, one 
published series of investigations (Stone, 1966, 1968c, 1968d, Stone 
and Skurdal, 1968) had made a promising and suggestive application of 
direct estimation methods with clinical judgmental materials. Exten­
sions have occurred in the evaluation of rehabilitation patients (Lipp, 
1969) and in physicians' judgments of concern (Theye, 1969), following 
Stone's initial efforts. Previous investigations in the present area 
have not seemed to employ methodologies sufficiently sensitive to the 
judgmental process. This fact may account for the rather disparate, 
and at times discouraging, results summarized by Goldberg (1968). 
Perhaps a direct measurement of the subjective judgmental process will 
provide a more descriptive account of clinical judgment, and will help 
clarify the ambiguities apparent in the glinical judgment literature. 
Direct estimation procedures seem to present a more useful way of dis­
cerning the "rules" of the clinician when interpreting a MMPI profile. 
These methods seem to provide a significant improvement in quantifica­
tion over the "think aloud" procedures previously employed (e.g., 
Kleinmuntz, 1969). The present study suggests, then, that the psycho­
physical analogy to the study of clinical judgment is both appropriate 
and beneficial, and it is indeed not unwarranted to speak of a "clini­
cal psychophysics" (Stone, 1968c).
Implications of the present study for formal training are many. 
This study represents an initial effort in attempting to provide a
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succinct, graphic presentation of clinical judgment of the MMPI. The 
ability to communicate with other clinicians and to train aspiring cli­
nicians would be greatly enhanced if significant questions concerning 
diagnosis and personality description wefe pursued in a similar manner. 
For example, in this study judgments were based on a "normal" patient. 
Additional information pertaining to "psychotic" or "neurotic" patients 
may prove beneficial to clinicians whose case load is comprised largely 
from these populations. If such graphic presentation is achieved, the 
"art" of MMPI analysis may become more uniform and standardized. Of 
course, such communication is possible only after extensive investiga­
tion in the future, including a validation of the judgments.
Several suggestions for future research are also indicated by 
this study. First, caution is urged in the selection of a standard for 
judgments. In a previous study (Theye, 1969), the selection of a stan­
dard from the middle range of an overt stimulus metric did not prove to 
be wholly appropriate for subjective judgments. The objectively deter­
mined standard was in the low range of subjective judgments. While cog­
nizant of the findings of Theye's study, the present study still employed 
a standard which was subjectively perceived as being too low. This 
result occurred even though the author was aware of these earlier cau­
tions and incorporated them into the design of the present study. Thus, 
a more rigorous search to obtain an appropriate judgmental standard is 
suggested.
Secondly, as previously mentioned, research should be directed 
to the question of differences in interpretation of T-scores below 50. 
Much interjudge disagreement was evident from these low scores, whereas
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high judgmental reliability was found for T~scores above 50. It thus 
seems quite helpful to regard the T-score distribution in this dichot­
omous manner when investigating clinical judgment on the MMPI. Again, 
the present methodology would seem to provide a meaningful tool of 
analysis.
Finally, a further analysis of judged inter-scale relationships 
is strongly suggested. The present study was limited to the investiga­
tion of single scale judgments. This limitation was imposed in an 
effort to understand and describe the basic or primary processes ini­
tially. With such an understanding, inter-scale interactions could 
then be made more meaningfully. Two means of examining inter-scale 
relationships may be appropriate. One method consists of scaling per­
ceived similarity of the basic MMPI scales on an unidimensional con­
tinuum. This could be accomplished by means of the Eisler-Ekman model 
(Eisler, 1960; Eisler and Elcman, 1959; Ekman, Goude and Waern, 1961).
A new multidimensional ratio scaling method has also been suggested 
(Ekman, 1963) which seems appropriate to use when studying perceived 
inter-scale relationships. Secondly, one may wish to examine the 
degree of pathology associated with various combinations of MMPI 
basic scale scores. The literature indicates that several scales 
are frequently interpreted in conjunction with one another (e.g.,
Pd-4 and Ma-9). A subjective degree of pathology could be ascer­
tained for varying scores on each scale. For example, judgments 
could be made concerning the degree of pathology indicated by a 
Pd-4 T-score of 75 and a Ma-9 T-score of 70, and so on. Such a 
procedure removes some of the artificiality present in this study.
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If it were possible to understand the MMPI scales in this fashion, future 
research extensions are innumerable.
On the basis of the present investigation, it may well be that, 
as Hunt and Jones (1962) have indicated, clinical judgment is basically 
the same as psychophysical sensory judgment only with more "noise" pre­
sent in the system. Further, as Stone (1968b) suggests, "Clinical 
psychophysics may represent a new unifying research concern for cli­
nical and human psychophysical psychologies" (p. 137).
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The conceptualization of clinical judgment has progressed from 
one in which no experimental manipulation was believed possible, to its 
present state, wherein clinical judgment is viewed as being amenable to 
scientific scrutiny. Much recent literature has been devoted to the 
topic of clinical judgment on the MMPI. In general, these studies indi 
cate that clinical judgment is .rather unreliable and, often times, non- 
valid. Most of these investigations have been concerned with the out­
come of the judgment, rather than with the judgmental process itself. 
Those few studies devoted to examining the process of clinical judgment 
have seemingly not employed sufficiently sensitive methodologies.
It'-has previously been substantiated that the psychophysical 
analogy is beneficial to apply when investigating clinical judgment.
The present study attempted to extend the psychophysical analogy to 
the investigation of the relationship between clinical judgment and 
the MMPI. Both direct estimation procedures, suggested by S. S. 
Stevens, and the classical psychophysical method of constant stimuli 
were employed in an effort to describe and quantify this relationship.
Thirty-two Ph.D. clinical psychologists experienced in the use 
of the MMPI served as judges. They made magnitude estimations (with 
assigned modulus) concerning the degree of importance of the basic MMPI
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scales (Hs-1 to Si-0) and the degree of pathology evidenced by T-scores 
(30 to 110) on each basic scale. Judges were also asked to indicate a 
T-score for each basic scale which represented the same degree of pathol­
ogy across all scales. The method of constant stimuli was used to deter­
mine a score on each validity scale (?, L, F, and K) which might invali­
date! a profile for interpretation. All judgmental stimuli were presented 
in a random fashion to each judge. All judgments were made in reference 
to a specified hypothetical patient.
In general, the results indicated that judges were unable to 
agree on the degree of pathology associated with T-scores below 50 for 
each basic scale. Judges from Minnesota tended to view lower T-scores 
as less pathological than did judges from Kansas. However, for T-scores 
above 50 on each basic scale, judges displayed high concordance in their 
subjective impressions of pathology. Perceived pathology was observed 
to increase in a curvilinear manner when plotted against the appropriate 
stimulus metric for each basic scale. Log-log transformations rectified 
the data reasonably well, suggesting that power functions could provide 
an appropriate description for these data. Cluster analyses of judgments 
revealed that certain T-score values were not seen as being significantly 
different from each other. A comparison of these subjective groupings 
with the usual didactic groupings was presented.
A cluster analysis of judgments concerning the importance of the 
basic scales in providing information pertinent to pathology indicated 
that three clusters may typify the data. The results of these judgments 
appeared to be valid when compared with the formal descriptions of the 
scales. A comparison of the present findings with previous results of 
the importance for the scales was made.
Judges were unable to agree highly among themselves when asked to 
equate T-scores for degree of pathology. A discussion of possible impli­
cations of this finding with respect to current and future research was 
included.
Judgmental thresholds of validity for the overall profile for 
interpretation were determined for three of the validity scales. For 
the remaining scale (F) , judges stated that even with the highest stim­
ulus value employed, the overall profile was still valid for interpreta­
tion. A discussion of the present results in comparison with MMPI inter­
pretative manuals was included.
Limitations of the present investigation were also discussed.
The judgmental task presented a somewhat artificial situation for the 
judges, and thus, the generality of the present results is restricted. 
Also, the standard selected for scaling the degree of pathology was 
found to be inappropriately low. Cautions for future research in this 
area were made. Finally, the a posteriori dichotomy of judges into 
Minnesota and Kansas groups did not reflect true inter-group homoge­
neity; such a dichotomy is suggestive only of one possible explanatory 
avenue.
The implications of the present study are many and varied.
First, it represents an extension of the psychophysical analogy into 
the present area of clinical judgment on the MMPI. The direct esti­
mation methodology employed seemed to provide a more sensitive measure 
of the subjective judgment process involved, and may be valuable to 
use when conducting future research in this area. Secondly, this study
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represents an initial effort to provide a succinct, graphic presentation
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of clinical judgment on the MMPI. The ability to communicate the infor 
mation obtained from experienced clinicians may enhance formal training 
procedures. Thirdly, future research extensions were suggested. An 
analysis of judged inter-scale relationships seems warranted, as well 





Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Oj,





Psychological Scale Values 
Mean Median 5-3
55 22.38 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 26.72 25.00 25.00 30.00
70 40.18 35.00 30.00 50.00
75 49.36 50.00 35.00 67.45
80 62.76 64.81 45.00 84.85
85 67.80 72.46 50.00 92.47
90 77.49 75.00 57.45 1 0 0 . 0 0
95 86.18 80.00 60.00 1 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 0 99.51 89.86 72.46 136.93
105 104.11 1 0 0 . 0 0 72.46 142.30
1 1 0 110.57 1 0 0 . 0 0 77.46 150.00
TABLE 14
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric 
of T-Scores Above 50 for









55 20.72 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 29.19 25.00 25.00 30.00
70 41.08 35.00 30.00 50.00
75 50.85 50.00 37.42 61.00
80 67.31 65.00 50.00 75.00
85 76.82 75.00 54.77 90.00
90 89.16 82.46 72.46 1 0 0 . 0 0
95 98.20 92.47 80.00 1 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 0 104.50 1 0 0 . 0 0 77.46 117.26
105 110.95 1 0 0 . 0 0 90.00 130.86
1 1 0 118.12 107.47 97.48 136.93
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TABLE 15
Psychological. Scale Values, Geometric 
of T-Scores Above 50 for
Means, Medians, Q,, 
Hy-3 Scale
and Q3
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median Si
55 24.51 25.00 20.98 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 30.41 28.46 25.00 30.00
70 42.49 39.68 30.00 50.00
75 53.63 50.00 40.00 72.46
80 66.79 75.00 47.43 94.87
85 69.95 75.00 50.00 1 0 0 . 0 0
90 87.95 82.46 72.46 111.80
95 95.93 94.85 72.46 1 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 0 107.67 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 136.93
105 113.44 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 158.13
1 1 0 117.51 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 173.20
TABLE; 16
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q., , and Q 0
of T-Scores Above 50 for Pd-4 Scale
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median Si S3
55 21.13 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 28.94 25.00 25.00 30.00
70 40.57 37.42 30.00 50.00
75 51.96 47.43 40.00 69.82
80 64.63 67.08 45.00 86.43
85 74.09 75.00 50.00 94.47
90 84.30 77.46 62.05 1 0 0 . 0 0
95 94.85 87.46 72.46 122.47
1 0 0 106.38 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 150.00
105 113.90 1 0 0 . 0 0 77.46 159.84
1 1 0 1 2 2 . 1 1 107.24 77.46 173.20
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TABLE 17
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q^, 




Psychological Scale Values 
Geometric Mean Median ^3
55 22.35 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 28.12 25.00 25.00 27.39
70 37.11 30.00 28.46 50.00
75 43.46 35.00 30.00 50.00
80 59.58 52.44 40.00 75.00
85 65.40 75.00 45.00 75.00
90 74.94 75.00 50.00 1 0 0 . 0 0
95 87.73 92.47 69.82 1 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 0 97.57 1 0 0 . 0 0 67.45 102.47
105 101.74 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 150.00
1 1 0 108.09 1 0 0 . 0 0 77.46 150.00
Psychological
TABLE 18
Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q^, 




Psychological Scale Values 
Geometric Mean Median S3
55 20.13 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 28.63 25.00 25.00 30.00
70 44.48 40.00 35.00 50.00
75 59.28 50.00 40.50 84.85
80 73.27 75.00 50.00 1 0 0 . 0 0
85 86.92 75.00 54.77 150.00
90 100.09 1 0 0 . 0 0 72.46 144.91
95 105.17 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 150.00
1 0 0 118.11 1 0 0 . 0 0 77.46 187.08
105 120.87 1 0 0 . 0 0 82.46 2 0 0 . 0 0
1 1 0 127.13 1 0 0 . 0 0 87.46 2 0 0 . 0 0
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TABLE 19
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q^, and







55 21.62 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 28.47 25.00 25.00 30.00
70 39.53 36.47 30.00 50.00
75 52.74 50.00 37.42 72.46
80 65.21 67.45 47.43 86.43
85 69.22 67.08 50.00 91.86
90 83.12 75.00 65.00 1 0 0 . 0 0
95 92.21 82.46 75.00 104.88
1 0 0 1 0 1 . 1 2 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 117.26
105 108.53 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 133.45
1 1 0 114.40 1 0 0 . 0 0 80.00 150.00
Psychological
TABLE 20
Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, CL, 








55 21.79 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 29.77 28.92 25.00 30.00
70 41.24 37.42 30.00 50.00
75 57.73 50.00 42.43 75.00
80 68.32 64.81 50.00 82.16
85 75.88 75.00 57.01 80.00
90 90.84 77.46 75.00 104.88
95 96.15 90.00 75.00 128.45
1 0 0 105.35 97.47 75.00 136.93
105 111.92 1 0 0 . 0 0 87.46 147.90
1 1 0 119.21 1 0 0 . 0 0 92.47 162.02
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TABLE 21
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, (£ , and Q
of T-Scores Above 50 for Ma-9 Scale
Stimulus Values 
T-Scores
Psychological Scale Values 
Geometric Mean Median S-3
55 22.90 25.00 25.00 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 27.53 25.00 25.00 30.00
70 37.34 35.00 30.00 50.00
75 48.70 42.43 35.00 75.00
80 62.49 52.44 45.00 75.00
85 72.51 67.45 52.44 82.46
90 91.16 80.00 72.46 1 0 0 . 0 0
95 95.82 90.00 72.46 1 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 0 108.02 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 117.26
105 108.27 1 0 0 . 0 0 75.00 104.88
1 1 0 113.21 1 0 0 . 0 0 87.18 125.00
TABLE 22
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q^, and
of T-Scores Above 50 for Si-0 Scale
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median Si S-3
55 20.73 23.98 2 0 . 0 0 25.00
60 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
65 28.49 26.98 25.00 30.00
70 40.47 37.99 30.00 50.00
75 51.59 50.00 37.42 62.45
80 63.69 69.82 41.47 77.46
85 76.16 75.00 51.48 1 0 0 . 0 0
90 86.38 82.46 57.45 1 0 0 . 0 0
95 92.85 89.86 60.00 136.93




Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q^, 








30 15.34 17.32 7.07 50.00
35 16.88 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 31.86
40 15.72 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
45 15.29 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
TABLE 24
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q-̂ , 
of T-Scores Below 50 for D-2 Scale
and Q3
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median
* 1 ^3
30 2 0 . 0 1 25.00 7.07 50.00
35 15.41 2 0 . 0 0 5.00 35.00
40 15.06 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.98
45 15.10 17.32 10.95 25.00
TABLE 25
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q, , and 
of T-Scores Below 50 for Hy-3 Scale
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median *1 s3
30 18.25 22.36 1 0 . 0 0 50.00
35 16.97 23.45 7.07 37.42
40 14.30 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
45 14.41 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
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TABLE 26
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, , and Q
of T-Scores Below 50 for Pd-4 Scale
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median 1̂ S3
30 20.72 25.00 1 0 . 0 0 42.43
35 20.89 23.45 1 0 . 0 0 42.43
40 18.34 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
45 17.04 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
TABLE 27
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q-, , and Q ̂
of T-Scores Below 50 for Mf-5 Scale
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median 4i S3
30 29.48 35.00 25.00 50.00
35 26.33 25.00 2 0 . 0 0 44.72
40 22.92 25.00 17.32 30.00
45 19.59 25.00 15.00 25.00
TABLE 28
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q-,, and
of T-Scores Below 50 for Pa- 6  Scale
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median *1 S3
30 32.49 47.43 19.36 59.16
35 28.85 32.40 2 0 . 0 0 50.00
40 22.99 25.00 17.32 44.72
45 22.47 25.00 15.97 34.64
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TABLE 29
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q-,, and Q„
of T-Scores Below 50 for Pt-7 Scale
Stimulus Values 
T-Scores
Psychological Scale Values 
Geometric Mean Median ^3
30 37.52 50.00 27.39 72.46
35 31.95 35.00 2 0 . 0 0 69.82
40 23.22 25.00 16.43 38.73
45 16.49 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
Psychological
TABLE 30
Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q-̂ , 
of T-Scores Below 50 for Sc- 8  Scale
and
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median Si S-3
30 17.35 25.00 10.00 36.74
35 17.91 23.45 10.00 35.00
40 17.21 2 0 . 0 0 12.25 25.00
45 16.86 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
TABLE 31
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric Means, Medians, Q,, and Q- 







30 39.74 50.00 25.00 75.00
35 35.40 45.00 25.00 72.46
40 28.14 30.00 21.79 50.00
45 22.43 25.00 15.00 30.00
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TABLE 32
Psychological Scale Values, Geometric 
of T-Scores Below 50 for
Means, Medians, Q , 
Si-0 Scale
and
Stimulus Values Psychological Scale Values
T-Scores Geometric Mean Median
h —3
30 24.14 25.00 1 0 . 0 0 50.00
35 19.71 23.45 1 0 . 0 0 50.00
AO 15.90 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
45 15.76 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 25.00
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